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Abstract:
This honors thesis examines the role of highly charged, highly covered, and
civilian-centered international events in the early Cold War’s development (1945-50). It
does this through the case study of American students Peter Sellers and Warren Oelsner,
who spent two months in Soviet military captivity in East Germany in 1949. Their case
received substantial media coverage and the US government eventually obtained their
release. By looking at a combination of government documents, newspaper articles, an
account written by Oelsner, and scholarship on public and elite opinion, I find that
although no single event of this magnitude had a significant effect on the early Cold War,
the evidence suggests that repeated over time, these events had a meaningful yet modest
influence, as American elites developed increasingly less favorable views of the Soviet
Union, seeing it as an existential threat and the American public increasingly viewed it as
a cruel and dangerous adversary.
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Chapter 1, Introduction:
During the summer of 1949, American college students Peter Sellers and Warren
Oelsner took a bike trip in Europe. The departure of their ship back to the United States
from Hamburg was delayed and they had a few extra days. They decided to venture
across the nearby border into East Germany out of curiosity. They were ignorant of the
repercussions of unauthorized travel and taking pictures. They were arrested by East
German police who immediately transferred them to Soviet soldiers. They remained in
Soviet military custody for two months before the US government was able to obtain
their release. Their imprisonment and the release negotiations were a high priority in
government and received substantial media coverage in the US.
I came to this case because Peter Sellers, one of the two young Americans held by
Soviet forces in Germany, is my late grandfather. His and Oelsner’s case raised two
primary historical and academic questions for me. One question, which I explore in this
honors thesis, is what role did the Sellers-Oelsner case, together with other similar cases,
play in the development of the Cold War during its early years (1945-50)? Specifically,
did highly charged, highly covered, and relatively more civilian-centered, less
geopolitical events contribute to the Cold War’s trajectory and development during those
years? Insofar as they did, what were the mechanisms behind their contribution and how
large a contribution was it? Drawing on a variety of primary sources, I reconstructed the
events of the Sellers-Oelsner case and through looking at the case’s effects on public and
elite opinion, I conclude if combined with other similar cases, it would have had a modest
yet significant impact on the early Cold War’s development. The other question that the
case raised was what the dynamics of the negotiations to free Sellers and Oelsner were
and what can these negotiations tell us about hostage release negotiations between states
more broadly, including why these state-state hostage situations occur so rarely. I have
studied and written about this question separately.
When considering the Cold War, the question arises: how did two allied countries
become such ardent adversaries in a mere five years and what caused that enmity? While
historians have extensively studied and reached relative consensus about the major
5

geopolitical causes of the Cold War, namely that the US and the Soviet Union grew to
distrust and fear each other following their cooperation in World War II, they have not
fully studied some of the other less significant but still impactful factors, such as the role
of events like the Sellers-Oelsner case. Once enmity between the US and USSR was
established, it fed itself and sustained the conflict. The Sellers-Oelsner case was dealt
with by foreign policy elites and covered by the general media. It therefore was in a
position to shape both public and elite opinion and thereby to affect how US foreign was
conducted. I will examine how events impact both public and elite opinion and then how
these sets of opinion affect the foreign policy and international relations.
The causal link between any particular event such as the Sellers-Oelsner case and
the development of the Cold War is not direct and no one relatively small event on its
own would have had an impact on the larger conflict’s development. Therefore, I use the
Sellers-Oelsner case to seek to understand the likely, qualitative effects of this type of
event on the Cold War’s development. Then, based on the frequent repetition of these
events over a longer period of time, I assess what their much more significant cumulative
effects would have been. That analysis serves to demonstrate the likely composite effects
of the Sellers-Oelsner case and similar cases on the early development of the Cold War.
Before I conduct this analysis, I draw extensively on primary sources from the SellersOelsner case to understand exactly what took place and how it was covered by the media.
I also draw on general histories of the Cold War and its development to situate the
Sellers-Oelsner case in the Cold War context. To assess the case’s qualitative effect on
the Cold War’s development, I then draw heavily on work concerning the relevant
dynamics to create a sequence of effects that would link these events to concrete foreign
policy decisions. These dynamics are the formation of public and elite foreign policy
opinion, the role of the idea of an “enemy” in US foreign policy, the biases of American
media coverage of the Soviet Union, the effects of media coverage on public opinion, and
the connection between public opinion and foreign policy decisions.
When beginning my research, I found that Cathal Nolan, an eminent scholar of
military, international relations, and US foreign policy history had already conducted
similar research in the last years of the Cold War. He examined how three events between
6

the end of WWII and 1950, which related to the treatment of American civilians and
POWs, affected elite American opinion and by extension, the early years of the Cold
War. He found that the perceived (and actual) maltreatment of Americans in such cases
did play a significant role in initially souring elite opinion of the Soviet Union and then
hardening elite opinion against it, an effect which he notes would have made the Cold
War more intense. One of my primary endeavors, therefore, is to seek to either confirm or
question his conclusions. Now, almost thirty years after the end of the Cold War with
greater access to previously classified documents and the ability to examine Cold War
history without many of the biases which might have influenced such research in 1990,
insofar as I find the same effects as Nolan, his conclusions are rendered even more
robust. The Sellers-Oelsner case is similar enough to Nolan’s case studies that observing
the same results confirms his findings. His and my case studies are different enough,
however, that similar findings strengthen his conclusions and show that there are many
more cases that feed the dynamics he observed, such that the cumulative effects of these
cases have to have been substantial. My research does confirm his findings. His research,
therefore, while it neither prompted me to ask these questions nor enabled my answering
them, is central to my work and enhances greatly the significance of my findings just as
mine does his.
Despite the similar aims and topics of my work and Nolan’s, our research also
differs in a number of respects. Methodologically, Nolan draws heavily on general
histories of the Cold War to examine his case studies and explore the views expressed by
elite policy makers about his cases. Relatively speaking, I rely less on these types of
sources and draw more on novel primary sources relating to my case study such as
newspaper articles, Oelsner’s account of the case, and state department documents.
Furthermore, I diverge from Nolan in that instead of focusing predominantly on elite
opinion and its formation, I also examine in detail the formation of public opinion and the
media coverage on which it was largely based. Thus, not only do I examine broader
trends in public opinion, but I examine the actual media coverage of the Sellers-Oelsner
case. In so doing I discuss questions such as the effects of public opinion on foreign
policy elites and thus by extension its effects on the trajectory of the Cold War, questions
7

Nolan does not discuss. Therefore, my work considers another dimension of the question
of how events like the ones we studied affected policy makers and the Cold war.
Assessing the connection between specific historical events and the trajectory of
the Cold War requires examining what the effects of these events were on the opinions of
two groups of people, namely the public and political, particularly foreign policy, elites. I
first examine how the opinions of each group are formed and then examine how the
opinions of each group affect the formulation of policy which in turn affected the Cold
War’s trajectory. I examine how elite opinion relies on general schematic understandings
of other countries and geopolitical issues, and how these schemas that elites build are
affected by events and thus lead to support for particular policies and policy inclinations.
To understand public opinion, I examine how it is formed, the role of the media in that
formation, and the nature of media coverage of the Soviet Union at the time. I then
present the scholarly consensus around how public opinion impacts the making of foreign
policy by serving to support certain foreign policy approaches and constrain others.
Through understanding how the American public viewed the Soviet Union, what the
public wanted to see from its leaders, and what it would punish them for, it is possible to
draw well founded conclusions about how events that affected public opinion affected
foreign policy beyond any direct effects those events had on elite opinion.
I find the question of how event-fueled public and elite opinion influenced the
Cold War to be of special interest and importance for several reasons. The first reason is
purely historical. It helps create an even deeper understanding of the particular events and
dynamics which affected the Cold War’s development. The second reason is that the
Cold War, which defined the latter half of the 20th century, continues, and will continue
for a long time, to inform contemporary geopolitics. Understanding the Cold War as well
as possible enhances our understanding of our current world by showing how we got to
where we are. Many current alliances, for instance, have their roots in the Cold War. The
third reason, and perhaps the most relevant one, is that the Sellers-Oelsner case sheds
light on a particular facet of bilateral relationships. As policy makers consider how they
might want to shape such a relationship, as journalists figure out how to cover it, and as
scholars endeavor to understand it, it will be useful to understand how certain types of
8

highly charged events concerning private citizens impacted the defining (conflictual)
bilateral relationship of the 20th century. Understanding the impacts of such events and
their potential implications for a larger relationship can allow policy makers to choose
whether they want these events to be quickly and quietly resolved or whether they view it
as advantageous to make them widely known and emotionally salient. If policy makers
are driven to make events more significant, which they may be tempted to do, it is crucial
that they understand the full effects of such a course of action. They must understand the
conflictual trajectory on which they are putting the relationship, the potential events’
effects on public opinion, and the risks that are involved. For us in 2020, great power
competition is on the rise, especially between the United States and China. How the SinoAmerican relationship develops will greatly influence the world over the coming century
and the conclusions that I draw should be relevant to policy makers, journalists, and
academics in both countries as they navigate the relationship.
Sources and Methods:
In order to examine the early Cold War’s development, I draw on a variety of
primary sources in addition to academic ones. Here I detail the primary sources that I
sought and was able to obtain, assess how reliable I think each type of source is and why,
and explain the ways in which particular sources are useful. To obtain US government
documents, I submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the Departments
of State and Defense as well as to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for any and all
documents relating to the case of Oelsner and Sellers. I have not yet received substantive
responses from the Department of Defense and CIA. Lacking documents from the
Department of Defense is especially limiting since the military, through the USMLM and
the military government, was tasked with negotiating their release and was the primary
authority dealing with their case. The Department of State sent me filing records
corresponding to a number of documents, only some of which still exist in the archives. I
obtained copies of those original documents, some of which were classified as SECRET
at the time. There are important officials and events described in news coverage neither
mentioned in the documents nor seemingly alluded to in the filing records. Therefore, I
have reason to believe that there were, and may still be, further relevant documents which
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originated at the Department of State and were not identified to me in the Department’s
response to my FOIA request. Nonetheless, the State Department documents I did obtain
are very useful. They consist of cables, drafts of communiqués eventually sent to the
Soviets, and memoranda summarizing events. They do include details and mention
officials not found in any of the other sources that I have. Furthermore, despite the gaps,
as a general matter they provide insight into how things worked within the government.
They show what the American government knew and thought compared to what the
press/public, Sellers/Oelsner, and the Soviets knew and thought at the same time. They
show within government who was being kept abreast of what, when, and by whom. They
show that the government was quite frank and forthcoming with the press about what it
knew and how it assessed the situation. They also show how little the government knew
initially about what had happened to Sellers and Oelsner and show the lengths that it
went to later to learn what had happened.
I contacted Warren(Jim) Oelsner who is still alive. Peter Sellers passed away after
battling cancer in 2014 before any research for this honors thesis began. Upon returning
from his imprisonment, Oelsner wrote a detailed account of his and Sellers’ experience
which he sent to me. Fifty-nine pages in length, it describes in detail the young men’s
experience from the moment they decided to go into the Soviet zone from Hamburg to
their release. Titled A Factual Account of the Author’s Experiences While in the Soviet
Zone of Germany, it appears to be a factual account, sometimes recording best guesses or
assumptions of what was taking place as well as guesses as to people’s motives, but
always naming these guesses and assumptions as such and providing the facts on which
these guesses and assumptions were based. It is almost completely in keeping with all
other sources and at times even paints Sellers and Oelsner in a worse light than the other
sources do, not omitting what in hindsight are embarrassingly foolish decisions that
Sellers and Oelsner made. This further enhances its credibility. His account is also more
detailed than the other sources and is often the only first-hand account of events. I take it
to be the most reliable account that I have and I defer to its factual claims in the very few
instances in which slight discrepancies emerge between it and other sources. His account
is invaluable to my research because it allows me to construct a more accurate and much
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more detailed chronology of the case than I would otherwise be able to. Furthermore, it
allows me to compare the ‘facts on the ground’ to what those who were responding to the
situation from afar knew, how they characterized the situation, and what they based their
responses on. For example, in assessing whether the Soviets really ever believed Sellers
and Oelsner were spies, it is very useful to know the list of government buildings that
Oelsner photographed.
I rely heavily on press coverage from the time to know what contacts the US
government had with its Soviet counterparts and with Sellers’ and Oelsner’s families as
well as what the US government knew and how it assessed the case. There are enough
gaps in the official documents that I was able to obtain that without press coverage, I
would be missing a large amount of crucial information. Sellers’ and Oelsner’s case was
widely covered. Many smaller newspapers from around the country have now been
digitized and I was able to get coverage from the Associated Press (AP), United Press
(UP), and International News Service (INS) which was carried by these papers. I also
accessed the digital archives of the New York Times, Washington Post, and a few
international papers, and through University of Pennsylvania records as well as saved
newspaper clippings sent to me by Oelsner, I gained access to much of the press coverage
from the local Philadelphia and New York papers near Sellers’ and Oelsner’s respective
hometowns which wrote their own stories. Between these newspapers, I have confidence
that I have almost all of the relevant press coverage. In total, this amounts to hundreds of
newspaper articles, almost every single one unique in some way. I also have confidence
in the substance of the press coverage because it reflects the State Department documents
which I obtained. Therefore, I feel confident that with a few minor exceptions, what the
US government told the press is what it knew to be true and reflects what its assessments
were at the time. In addition to the factual account I can construct from the press
coverage, it is very important to this inquiry to see how and how much the case was
covered. This allows me to draw much firmer conclusions about how its coverage
affected public opinion.
Another source that is integral to this thesis is public opinion (polling) data. I
obtained these data through academic sources devoted to polling about the Soviet Union
11

and the Cold war. These data provide insight into how Americans viewed the Soviet
Union starting in the 1930s. They show long-standing trends in public opinion as well as
the end-of-the-war public opinion baseline in 1945. These data then show how quickly
public opinion changed between 1945 and the early fifties as well as what the qualitative
shifts in public opinion were over those years. Understanding what the changes to public
opinion were shows what changes in opinion need to be accounted for which is crucial in
trying to determine how events like the Sellers-Oelsner case contributed to the shifts in
public opinion.
I also tried to obtain Soviet and East German documents. I submitted inquiries to
numerous German archives. Due to the unavailability of documents which were
generated by Soviet occupying forces before the founding of East Germany later in 1949,
these inquiries yielded nothing. Additionally, I had contact with a Russian historian of the
Cold War. Russian archives are quite closed and administrative as well as time
constraints led to her only finding one brief mention of the case.
Briefly, the following chapters contain the following portions of this thesis. The
next chapter, chapter two, summarizes the literatures most important to my analysis of
the Sellers-Oelsner case and explains my contributions to them. It is the work contained
in these literatures which allows me to construct the sequence of effects that is so critical
to my findings. In the following three chapters, chapters three, four, and five, I lay out the
Sellers-Oelsner case and its context. Chapter three presents the causes and key events of
the early Cold War as well as the Germany specific context that is integral to
understanding the Sellers-Oelsner case. Chapter four provides a detailed account of the
events of the case itself, switching back and forth between what was taking place where
Sellers and Oelsner were and how the larger world was reacting based on what it knew.
Chapter five then analyzes the press coverage that the case received, providing examples
and exploring how its biases were in keeping with how the American press covered the
Soviet Union at the time. Chapter six draws on the prior three chapters as well as findings
from the literature to assess the likely effects of the Sellers-Oelsner case on public and
elite opinion. Chapter seven draws principally from the findings in chapter six and the
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literature, and to a lesser extent the findings in chapter three, four, and five, to draw
conclusions about how those effects on opinion translated into concrete effects on policy.
Finally, chapter eight summarizes my findings and proposes areas for future research.
Chapter 2, Literature Review:
This honors thesis draws on and contributes to historical, psychological, and
political science literatures. In many cases, these fields have become mixed at the result
of interdisciplinary work. Therefore, especially in the cases of the political science and
psychology literatures, it does not make sense to separate by their field. Instead, I
separate them by the question they seek to answer.
Many eminent Cold War historians, such as John Gaddis, Walter LaFeber, and
Herbert Feis have studied the conflict’s principal causes. After years of work and the
increasing declassification of American and Soviet government documents, they have
reached relative consensus about the principal causes of the Cold War. There is broad
agreement that differing political and economic systems, different cultures, hard security
concerns, and quickly building mutual suspicion and mistrust all played critical roles in
the rapid development of the Cold War. These histories focus on the key dynamics and
events that shaped the relationship’s larger trajectory. They often neglect, however, to
examine in isolation, if at all, those smaller events which were not integral to determining
the Cold War’s trajectory but which likely contributed to it, such as the Sellers-Oelsner
case. They especially frequently neglect to apply the amount of focus that would
accompany social scientific inquiry into the roles that these events played in the SovietAmerican relationship and the development of the Cold War. They do not explore
questions such as the one that I research in this thesis. Instead, at most, Cold War
histories simply mention these events in passing as examples of larger phenomena. This
thesis finds that highly charged and highly covered, less geopolitical and more and
civilian-centered events contributed meaningfully but were not integral to the
development of the Cold War, adding that finding as well as the novel study of the
Sellers-Oelsner case to the historical literature.
13

In an exception to that trend, the specific question of how such events affected the
conflict has already been the subject of some scholarship. In 1990, Cathal Nolan
published an article, “Americans in the Gulag: Detention of US Citizens by Russia and
the Onset of the Cold War, 1944-1949,” in the Journal of Contemporary History which
concluded that while it was not “a principal cause of the Cold War,” “the Soviet Union’s
disregard for the rights and welfare of Americans … was a contributory cause of the
breakdown in American-Soviet relations which began just after signature of the Yalta
Agreements.” His work explores three cases. One was the fate of American POWs who,
initially prisoners of Nazi Germany, came to be held by the Soviet Union as it swept
across Europe taking control of the territory from the defeated Germans. After initial poor
treatment and delay in the return of these POWs, the situation was made more severe by
the fact that some of them were never returned and sent to Gulags in Siberia. The second
case was that the marriages of US diplomatic personnel serving in the Soviet Union to
Soviet wives were not recognized as legitimate and the wives were prohibited from
joining their husbands in the United States, separating families. The third case was the
refusal of the Soviet Union to recognize the citizenship of around 2,000 American
citizens of Soviet birth or descent, its prohibiting them from leaving the country, and its
condemnation of hundreds of these people to forced labor in gulags. His findings are
notable and conclusive. He found that these cases did negatively and substantially affect
the views of US foreign policy officials towards the Soviet Union, something he proves
through public and non-public statements by those officials in which they express anger
and moral repugnance, emotions that contributed to the breakdown in relations. Nolan is
to my knowledge, however, the only person who has explicitly studied the question of
how such events affected the Cold War.
My research, thirty years later in a different political environment with more
documents available, asks nearly the same questions as Nolan did, though it considers
more heavily the roles of media coverage and public opinion of the Soviet Union as
aspects of the case that also would have affected the Cold War’s trajectory. His case
studies were similar to mine in that they were distinct events which had the plight of
Americans at their core. Nonetheless, while his research did focus on isolated events,
14

these events were the result of larger scale Soviet policies, they were predictable from the
perspective of the government in that they unfolded more slowly over a somewhat longer
period of time, the result of the events was far more dire without happy endings similar
the return of Sellers and Oelsner, and the number of Americans implicated in these events
was in the hundreds or thousands. One of my principal findings, namely that the SellersOelsner case would have negatively impacted elite views of the Soviet Union, confirms
Nolan’s on the effects of these events on elite opinion. That his findings are confirmed by
a case study that is similar but not identical to his renders his findings even more robust
than they already were.
One crucial literature which informs my discussion of the effects that events like
the Sellers-Oelsner have on foreign policy elite decision making is the literature on elite
opinion in the Cold War context. This literature concerns both how elite opinion is
formed and structured, and its effects on policy outcomes. A number of scholars have
proposed and tested theories of how elites formed and structured their opinion of the
Soviet Union and the Cold War. Ole Holsti,1 for instance, draws on theories of enemy
images, national images, and belief systems. He proposes that these conceptions of the
Soviet Union drove how foreign policy elites approached international relations with it.
The more adversarial their perceptions were, the more aggressive the policies they
supported were. Alexander George2 writes of operational codes and Herrman et al.3 write
of cognitive schemata. All of these concepts are very similar and these scholars among
others have consistently found them to play important roles in structuring elite opinion.
They all examine how elites reacted to certain issues in the relationship as well as how
those reactions were affected by their more general perceptions.
Deborah Welch Larson has made the most comprehensive and detailed
contribution to this literature. In her article "The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in
Foreign Policy Decision-Making," Larson explains that from a human psychological
standpoint, humans do not have the memory capacity to retain all the things they

1

Holsti, 1962, p 244-6, Holsti 1967, p 34-9.
George, 197-201.
3
Herrman et al., 405-9.
2
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experience or think about in detail. Therefore, the mind creates schemas which
incorporate the key conclusions that people draw from each of their individual
experiences. These schemas also include their intellectual understandings of things and
particular examples of their beliefs. The schemas provide powerful ways of
understanding the world and guide one’s thinking about future information and
experiences. All of the concepts that her colleagues have written about are components of
schemas. Therefore, while Larson is in agreement with her colleagues and their findings,
the schema concept that she puts forward is created from a wider range of contributing
inputs and is therefore an even more powerful psychological device. Larson also wrote
two books about the history of the Cold War in which she applies schema and other
psychological theories to the conflict. In those books, she studies a number of Cold War
events in detail and demonstrates the role that these psychological phenomena played.
She found that schemas and schematic devices were central to how foreign policy elites
approached the conflict and understood the Soviet Union. In addition to her work,
Holsti’s, and others’ find that, in their cases, the components of schemas have large
impacts on how foreign policy makers understand the world and thus what decisions they
end up making.
The schema concept is very useful to understanding how the Sellers-Oelsner case
would have affected public opinion. It shows how elite involvement in the SellersOelsner case would have translated into lasting, negative impressions of the Soviet Union
as well as how it could have served as one of the examples of Soviet transgression in an
elite’s Cold War schema. By showing how the schema concept applies to a detailed
examination of the Sellers-Oelsner case, to which it has never been applied but which is
an event from the Cold War, I confirm schema theory’s applicability to the Cold War and
its usefulness for understanding the conflict.
Another literature, which shares psychological roots with the elite opinion
literature, is the public opinion formation and structure literature. Hurwitz and Peffley
have studied Cold War public opinion a number of times4 and as they wrote in their 1990

4

Hurwitz et al., p 21-3 , Peffley et al., 453-5.
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paper "Public Images of the Soviet Union: The Impact on Foreign Policy Attitudes," the
public, like elites, is not able to remember and carefully think through many issues.
Therefore, members of the public rely on general conceptions and understandings to
guide their thinking about foreign policy. Hurwitz and Peffley specifically examined
whether, in addition to underlying values such as patriotism, perceptions that the Soviet
Union was threatening and untrustworthy would lead to increased support for more
aggressive Cold War policies. They found that they did. This finding suggests that
anything that would have furthered these perceptions, like the Sellers-Oelsner case,
would have led to more public support for more aggressive Cold War policy. Their
theory of public opinion formation has not been studied by many other people and they
have certainly studied it in the most depth. In developing their theory, they borrowed a lot
from those primarily studying elites, such as Holsti. Furthermore, another strand in this
literature is the elite (or followership) theory by which the public gets their foreign policy
views from elites. By providing an alternate explanation and one that is durable since
long standing, foundational perceptions cannot be changed immediately, their findings
suggest limitations of the elite theory.
A subset of this literature explores how media coverage of particular topics affects
public opinion of those topics. Since it is assumed that the media which people consume
will influence what they think, there is not a lot of research studying that general
relationship. Scholars have, however, examined particular facets of the intersection
between media consumption and public opinion. That research has two primary findings.
One, which is best demonstrated by a 1983 study from Don Munton,5 is that media
themes that are favorable to a given policy will lead to increased support for that policy.
Implicit in that finding is that media coverage does influence public opinion. Not only
does media coverage impact the public’s views on particular topics, it also determines
what issues are the most salient and front of mind. Known as agenda setting, this
phenomenon is widely recognized in the literature and was the subject of recent research

5

Munton, 207-13.
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in 2016 by Carmichael and Brulle who looked at public concern about climate change.
They found that concern about climate change rose with media coverage of the issue.6
Combined, the two main elements of the public opinion formation literature,
namely that public opinion on foreign policy is heavily influenced by general, underlying
perceptions and that media coverage strongly fluences public opinion, have important
implications. They suggest that events that receive media coverage and which can
reasonably be assumed to contribute to hostile perceptions, have significant impacts on
public opinion. The Sellers-Oelsner case is obviously one such event. I do not directly
contribute to this literature. As with the other literatures that I draw on, the extent of my
contribution is to provide an example which is seemingly explained by the given theory.
The final literature concerns the effects of public opinion on foreign policy
makers and their decisions. This literature is the democratic-responsiveness theory half of
a larger literature which studies the relationship between elite and public opinion. The
other half of the larger literature, the elite theory half, concerns the influence of elite
opinion and elite cues on public opinion and is not relevant to the question that I seek to
answer in this thesis, namely whether events like the Sellers-Oelsner case, through their
influence on public opinion, affect policy making and by extension the Cold War. There
is widespread consensus in this literature that public opinion does impact what decisions
foreign policy elites make. There is similarly widespread consensus that elites cannot rely
on always being able to shape public opinion. The literature concludes that for major
foreign policies, the support of the public is necessary in the long run and that therefore
public opinion can cause elites to alter current policies or lead not to enact policies that
don’t have sufficient support. Jennifer Cunningham and Michael Moore7 found that
public opinion and elite opinion closely track each other over time and found that much
of the continuity between the two sets of opinion was due to public opinion impacting
elite opinion and elites adjusting accordingly.
In a 1991 study, Thomas Risse-Kappen found that public opinion had significant
effects on elite policy making in the US, France, West Germany, and Japan. He found
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that those effects took the form of restraining what policies elites pursue in that “policy
makers do not decide against overwhelming public consensus.”8 Risse-Kappen assessed
that the mechanism through which the public had this influence was their affecting elite
coalition building within the given country’s political system. Douglas Foyle9 also shows
that public opinion impacts elite foreign policy decision making. Unlike Risse-Kappen,
however, he focuses on the views of particular policy makers and examines their
normative beliefs on whether the public’s preferences should be taken into account as
well as their assessment of whether public support for foreign policies is necessary. He
found that policy makers’ views on these questions affects the role that public opinion
plays, with those who believe that public opinion should influence foreign policy and
those who believe that public support is necessary taking public opinion into account
much more. Furthermore, he found that Eisenhower and Dulles behaved relative to public
opinion as their beliefs about its role would predict. In line with both Risse-Kappen,
Cunningham et al., and Foyle, Philip Powlick and Andrew Katz10 document a long
history of elites closely monitoring public opinion, suggesting that if nothing else, foreign
policy elites think public opinion matters which in turn means that it does.
The democratic-responsiveness theory literature is critical to this thesis because it
shows how changes to public opinion that saw the public hold more negative views of the
Soviet Union would have influenced Cold War decision makers as they formulated
policy, which by extension would have had an influence on the trajectory of the Cold
War. I do not contribute much at all to this literature through my analysis of the SellersOelsner case other than by providing an example in which the democratic-responsiveness
theory seems to explain what I observed.
Lastly, there have only been two mentions of the Sellers-Oelsner case. One is less
than a paragraph long in a book about shipping history.11 The other is a paragraph in a
State Department publication introducing Ambassador Kirk’s protest letter to the Soviet
Union which was being reprinted. That paragraph, which is otherwise accurate,
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mistakenly asserts that Sellers and Oelsner crossed the border into the Soviet zone of
Germany inadvertently.12 Beyond these mentions, the case is completely unstudied and
absent from the historical record. This thesis both introduces the detailed study of the
case and sets the record straight as to Sellers’ and Oelsner’s intentions when they entered
the Soviet zone.
I see the following as my primary contributions to prior scholarship. First, the
Sellers-Oelsner case has never been the subject of any historical or academic writing.
Therefore, I am introducing the detailed study of the event to the annals of Cold War
history. Second, I provide further evidence to support Nolan’s conclusions using a similar
but not identical kind of case study, thus making his conclusions only more robust. Third,
I am augmenting the historical literature around the development of the Cold War more
broadly by presenting evidence that the cumulative effect of many smaller events was to
contribute to the American public turning on the Soviet Union, which in turn provided
public support and appetite for the waging of the Cold War. Fourth, I am applying
research and theories of how elite opinion is formed and structured and how it affects
foreign policy decisions, how public opinion is formed and structured, especially by
media coverage of events like the Sellers-Oelsner case, and how public opinion impacts
elites’ foreign policy decisions to a detailed case study. In doing so, I am providing
confirmation of this scholarship on which I draw by providing a further example of how
these theories play out in the world. Since they play out as expected, I bolster their
validity and applicability. Lastly, I am drawing upon a number of literatures concerning,
for example, the relationship between public opinion and elite opinion, and using such
relationships as segments in sequences of effects to link the compounding of events like
the Sellers-Oelsner to foreign policy decision making, which bears on geopolitical
outcomes. The detailed studies of the specific relationships on which I rely are individual
segments in the sequences and by themselves do not establish the sequences of effects
which I propose. Future scholarship should examine these sequences and seek further
examples of them.
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Chapter 3, The State of US-Soviet Relations:
Having laid out the contours of this honors thesis in the preceding chapter, this
chapter briefly presents the larger history of the Soviet-American relationship and the
development of the Cold War, which is critical to understanding the Sellers-Oelsner case
and its contribution to the conflict. In so doing, I present the consensus among historians
concerning the principal causes of the Cold War as well as some of the most critical
events, conditions, and statements which caused or exemplified the Cold War’s
development. The end of this chapter will also explore important elements of the
particular situation in Germany in the summer of 1949, which provide necessary context
for the events of the Sellers-Oelsner case.
In the summer of 1949, the Cold War was solidly, albeit recently, underway. Prior
to the outbreak of WWII, the US and Soviet Union had not enjoyed good relations. There
were a variety of reasons for this. Chief among them were substantial differences
between the two countries in terms of their systems and values, the lack of close
historical and political bonds, and elements of each one’s national character which
offended the national character of the other. Arising from these differences, the American
public and American elites held the Soviet Union in low esteem. For example, the
rejection of religion by the Soviet state and the persecution of Christians was an affront to
America’s ideals of religious freedom generally and to America’s Christians
specifically,13 especially Catholics.14 As a result, the American public’s opinion of the
Soviet Union was quite negative. Striking public opinion data from 1937-9 shows that at
that time Americans preferred fascism to communism.15 It was not just the public. The
US and Soviet Union only normalized diplomatic relations in 1933.16
WWII brought the US, UK, and Soviet Union into an alliance whose purpose was
winning the war with a special focus on defeating Nazi Germany in Europe. The wartime
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necessity of this alliance had two effects. One was that it brought the US and the Soviet
Union closer together as a result of increased collaboration and communication. The
highest levels of the two governments developed relations with each other that were far
deeper than they had been before the war. The other was that because all other issues
paled in comparison to the main task at hand, there were a number of outstanding issues
between the two countries that were ignored and forgotten until after the war when they
reemerged. Accompanying improved relations, American public opinion of the Soviet
Union became more favorable over the course of the war. The share of the public which
thought the Soviet Union should receive no wartime assistance from the US dropped by
10% and a whopping 80% of Americans both wanted and predicted post-war
collaboration with the Soviet Union.17 Showing a similar upward trend in Soviet
favorability though also significant remaining skepticism of the Soviet Union’s
trustworthiness, in hindsight a quite predictive finding, Americans’ trust in the Soviet
Union to cooperate after the war rose from 40% in the winter 1942 to 50% in the spring
of 1944, peaking at 55% in December of 1943 following the Moscow conference.18
While these seemingly idiosyncratic results might be explained in part by different
pollsters having asked the questions, they indicate that, without having lost their longstanding distrust of the Soviet Union, Americans wanted and had a hard time imagining
anything but continued cooperation.
By 1944, when an Allied victory became a matter of when instead of if,
Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin began to plan for and discuss the postwar world. At this
time, Soviet-American relations were good enough that it was not clear whether the
countries’ post-war relationship would deteriorate again or whether it would contain
significant goodwill and cooperation. As noted above, the public as well as many
governmental and non-governmental elites supported a cooperative relationship with the
Soviet Union following the war.19 One of the largest questions concerning Europe was
the futures of soon to be liberated countries--which great power would wield influence in
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them and what types of political and economic systems would be in place where. In
February of 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met at the Yalta Conference which
produced agreements about Soviet entry into the Pacific theater and by what terms was
Germany to be defeated and divided, as well as the Declaration of Liberated Europe
which served as the primary blueprint for the future of those countries which the Red
Army was liberating from Nazi Germany. This agreement spelled out the post-war status
of these soon to be liberated countries including Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria among
others. It stipulated that the Soviet Union and Soviet-aligned local actors would have
disproportionate influence in the futures of these countries but that there would also be
free elections to decide how their people wanted to be governed.20 The agreement was
vague because its parties couldn’t agree on more specific terms. According to
Roosevelt’s chief of staff, the agreement’s lack of specificity meant that the Soviet Union
“could stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without ever technically breaking
it.”21 Though the countries were still wartime allies against the not yet defeated Germans
and Japanese, significant tensions and apprehensions were emerging in the relationship,
both when Roosevelt was negotiating the agreement and then even more starkly when
Truman came to power and confronted the Soviet Union over what he termed violations
of the agreement among other things.
Increasingly strained relations began to sour rapidly immediately after World War
II’s end. Nonetheless, initially different high-ranking officials in the US government held
differing views as to how the US should engage with its Soviet counterpart. Some,
including President Truman, were more suspicious while others, such as Secretary of
State James F. Byrnes, were more inclined towards cooperation. By February of 1946,
even Byrnes would have given up on cooperation.22 Multiple factors contributed to the
breakdown in relations. One was a change in American foreign policy thinking brought
about by World War II which was newly concerned with the prospect of one country
controlling sufficient industrial resources to dominate the world, impose its system on the
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world, and defeat the US. The prospect of the Soviet Union completely controlling the
Eurasian landmass was intolerable and terrifying to American policy makers.23 Another
was what the US government saw as blatant Soviet violations of core parts of the Yalta
agreement as well agreements concerning Germany. While the US also did not abide by
all of the commitments it made before the end of the war, sometimes securing more
favorable outcomes when it had the power to impose them such as the US blocking the
Soviet Union from extracting reparations from the Allied zones of occupation which
would become West Germany, the American perception was that the Soviet Union’s
violations were egregious and a fundamental betrayal of trust. This perception is certainly
fair. One of the most prominent examples of a Soviet violation is its reneging on its Yalta
agreement commitment to elections in Soviet-controlled Eastern European countries.
Contributing to the strife surrounding the Yalta agreement was the fact that Truman has
not been privy to Roosevelt’s foreign policy making and therefore did not understand the
political decisions that Roosevelt had made when negotiating at Yalta, many of which
involved concessions to the Soviet Union.24 That increased his distrust of the Soviet
Union as well as its distrust of the United States. Cold War historians agree that the
breakdown in trust was of critical detriment to the relationship25 and it is difficult to
overstate just how large a role disagreements over the Yalta Agreement played in that
breakdown of trust. Herbert Feis chronicles that importance in his book From Trust to
Terror: the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950.
As a more actively adversarial relationship between the superpowers quickly
developed, momentum towards cold war snowballed and relationship-stressing events
proliferated. Stalin’s hostile 1946 speech inaugurating the Five-Year Plan and the Soviet
Union’s quick assertion of control over Eastern Europe were among such events. Another
major factor in the deteriorating relationship was the differing political and economic
systems of the two countries. In so far as the United States was trying to design a new
global system and institutions to realize it, the Soviet Union’s refusal to participate in
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organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its blocking otherwise
interested countries from participating in the Marshall Plan directly hindered American
efforts.26 Finally, the vastly different values of the two countries, namely capitalist
democracy on the part of the US and authoritarian communism on the part of the Soviet
Union, provided fertile ground for moral disapproval of the other’s and a greater sense
that the geopolitical success of the other would come at the expense of cherished
values.27 All these dynamics compounded each other. Lack of trust made potential
expansion seem more threatening. Incompatible systems based on different values made
that expansion more threatening. The eminent Cold War historian John Gaddis
emphasizes the degree to which all these factors combined to cause the conflict. While he
is receptive to revisionist critiques of the US which argue that the Cold War was not
totally inevitable and that certain flawed assessments of the world caused the US to
misinterpret and thus respond unnecessarily forcefully to the Soviet Union, Gaddis
stresses that the views and assumptions of US policy makers were rational and that they
rarely had good alternatives.28 The famous Long Telegram that same year exemplified
the already emerging consensus that Moscow was fundamentally an adversary. In it,
deputy head of the mission in Moscow George Kennan wrote “we have here a political
force [the USSR] committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no
permanent modus vivendi that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of
our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international
authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.”29
Europe was soon largely divided along de facto, soon to be officially designated,
lines of control. Those countries that Soviet troops had occupied after the war such as
Poland and Romania rapidly became communist dictatorships with illiberal help from the
Soviet Union. In contrast, those that were occupied by British and American forces, such
as Greece, mostly became capitalist democracies. Similar contests over which
superpower’s preferred government would hold power also took place in Asia, most
26
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notably in China and Korea. In Greece, however, the emergence of the US’ preferred
government required American intervention and on March 12th, 1947, President Truman
addressed a joint session of Congress asking it to appropriate resources for Greece. His
speech is remembered for proposing the Truman Doctrine, namely that to support “free
peoples,” America would contain the spread of (Soviet) communism anywhere in the
world.30 Five days later, President Truman again appealed to Congress, this time asking it
to quickly pass the massive Marshall Plan and resume the selective service, both of which
it did by wide majorities. He urged these measures to counter the “increasing threat” of
the Soviet Union and ensure the “survival of freedom.”31 These speeches both constituted
a notable shift in rhetoric that would last throughout the rest of the Cold War and
signified an all of government acceptance of the Cold War.
When exactly the Cold War began is the subject of differing opinions with
different Cold War historians making different claims and using different criteria to
decide what constitutes the Cold War. To some it started as soon as World War II ended
while to others it started as late as 1947 with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine.
What causes were the most significant and the extent to which they were avoidable is
similarly the subject of some debate which often breaks down along ideological lines. For
Sellers and Oelsner, however, when exactly between 1945 and 1947 the Cold War started
and what its causes were are not particularly relevant. By 1949, less than four short years
after the end of WWII, the adversarial relationship between the US and the USSR had
cemented itself and greatly intensified, and the Cold War was well underway.
No single event reflects the state of the relationship in 1949 better than the Soviet
blockade of Berlin and the Berlin Airlift. The city of Berlin, like the rest of Germany,
was divided into British, French, American, and Soviet occupation zones. Berlin was
located deep in the Soviet zone. To reach their zones and by extension to sustain the
people living in those zones, the Americans, British, and French Allies had to pass
through the Soviet zone. In retaliation for the increased integration of the Allied zones in
West Germany and the introduction of the Deutschmark, as well as in an effort to force
30
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the Allies out of Berlin all together, the USSR increased its number of troops in the
Soviet zone of Berlin and formed a blockade, preventing Allied trains and trucks from
reaching Berlin and depriving the city’s population of basic necessities. To provide for
the people of Berlin and more importantly, from a geostrategic perspective, to maintain
the Allied presence in Berlin, the US and Britain supplied the Allied zones by plane with
over 2.3 million tons of food, fuel, and machinery. The USSR recognized Allied resolve
and eventually lifted the blockade. The Soviet blockade and airlift showed the US that the
USSR was willing to hold over two million people hostage to force the US to abandon
territory designated to it by mutual agreement and that the USSR presented an existential
threat to American interests. Furthermore, it showed the effectiveness of taking a hard
line against the USSR. On the other side, the blockade and airlift showed the USSR that
the US was steadfast in its commitment to Berlin and Germany, and that it would expend
blood and treasure to secure its interests.
The Berlin Airlift, the official creation of the Soviet-controlled German
Democratic Republic and the Western-aligned Federal Republic of Germany, and other
events of 1949 made Germany a focal point of the Cold War, especially in that year. Both
the US and USSR spied on the other and both feared being spied on by the other. In that
environment the illegal presence of one country’s citizens in the other would have
automatically prompted suspicion and drawn scrutiny. Also at the same time, since the
Cold War was young and had just recently developed into the intense struggle of the next
four decades, both countries were still learning how the other operated and neither knew
what was characteristic of how the other spied.
For Sellers and Oelsner, who were detained less than three months after the end of
the blockade, the effects of the tense relationship and recent events in Germany were that
the Soviets were especially suspicious of Americans and especially attentive to anything
they might regard as sinister. This made the Soviets more apt to think that Sellers and
Oelsner were spies rather than foolish youths. While it is understandable that two college
students making last minute plans were neither fully cognizant of the political situation
nor had given its implications substantial consideration, it is equally understandable that
Soviet authorities found it hard to believe that Americans were innocently entering the
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Soviet zone simply to see it and were innocently taking pictures because things looked
interesting. Thus, from the perspective of Sellers’ and Oelsner’s intentions receiving
charitable interpretation by the Soviets, it was the worst possible time for them to
illegally enter the Soviet zone.
The bureaucratic situation in Germany in 1949 was also relevant to Sellers’ and
Oelsner’s case. In 1947, the US created the United States Military Liaison Mission
(USMLM). It had locations in Potsdam and West Berlin, and although it was led and
staffed by US military officers and personnel, its missions were diplomacy and
intelligence gathering. It served as the primary diplomatic link between the United States’
occupying forces and their British, French, and Soviet counterparts. Between 1947 and
the USMLM’s close in 1990, its personnel developed expertise and procedures,
especially relating to interaction with the Soviets. The two sides also developed some
level of mutual understanding as to how certain situations would be approached and what
each country’s respective mission was empowered to do by higher authorities. The
USMLM is regarded as an example of successful diplomacy between the US and USSR
during the Cold War and is credited with helping prevent hot war in Germany.32 In 1949,
however, the USMLM and its Soviet counterpart had not yet developed much of the
mutual understanding and many of the procedures that they would go on to develop. The
lack of a more established diplomatic relationship between US and Soviet forces meant
that at the time of Sellers’ and Oelsner’s disappearance and detention, the USMLM had
neither as robust diplomatic procedures in place nor as deep an understanding of the
Soviets as it would go one to develop. Therefore, it is likely that had the same incident
occurred twenty years later, the USMLM would have been able to obtain their release
more quickly, potentially even days later.
In summary, in the summer of 1949, the Cold War was a full-fledged, zero-sum
global power struggle. Both the US and the Soviet Union regarded the potential power of
the other as an existential threat. Importantly, however, public opinion lagged behind
elite opinion. For example, in June, 1946 when the vast majority of American elites had
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already soured on the Soviet Union and had already undertaken significant steps to make
the public share those views, when asked whether Russia was taking actions to become a
ruling power or for its own protection, 58% said ruling power and 29% said protection.33
By May, 1949 those numbers had shifted to 66% and 15% and would eventually reach
79% and 10% in July of 1953.34 Thus from the perspective of public opinion, the Cold
War was still gaining steam, allowing events in 1949 to still have a substantial influence
on the Cold War through their effects on public opinion.
Chapter 4, The Story of the Sellers-Oelsner Case:
Just as the previous chapter presents the history of the Cold War’s development,
this chapter, drawing on the primary sources that I was able to obtain, presents the history
of the Sellers-Oelsner case. Understanding the facts of their case in detail is critical to
assessing their case’s effects on elite and public opinion as well as analyzing the media
coverage of their case. It is also an interesting and compelling story in its own right that
deserves to be told in full.
During the summer of 1949, Peter Hoadley Sellers and Warren James Oelsner,
undergraduate students at the University of Pennsylvania, took a bike trip in Britain and
France. They then took a train to Hamburg where they were scheduled to board a ship on
July 30st to take them back to the United States. The shipping line they were to have
travelled back on was owned by Oelsner’s father. Upon arrival in Hamburg early on July
29th, they learned that the ship had been delayed for repairs until August 2nd leaving
them three days to explore. At the time Hamburg was located in the British occupation
zone and was not far from the border between the British and Soviet zones. In his account
of their time in captivity, Oelsner writes that they decided to bike towards the border
between the British and Soviet Zones and that they “welcom[ed] the opportunity of
seeing what constituted the Iron Curtain.” Outside the small border town of Büchen in the
British zone, Sellers and Oelsner were questioned by British border officials who
33
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“warned” them, as the interaction is characterized in Oelsner’s account, that they were
near the Soviet zone. Oelsner writes that acting against this advice, “we ascertained its
[the Soviet zone’s] general location and proceeded on our way.”35 It was clearly their
intention to enter the Soviet zone. They soon crossed the border by bicycle south of
Büchen and along the way, Oelsner photographed a small building which the students
later learned was a local headquarters of the Soviet border authorities. A sign partially in
Russian, which Oelsner also photographed, confirmed their arrival in the Soviet zone.
The following morning, after spending the night in a field nearby, Sellers and
Oelsner hid their bikes and reentered Boizenburg where they had eaten late the night
before. There Oelsner took another picture before they found a place to eat breakfast.
This picture was of a shipyard which happened to serve as a communist meeting place.
While they waited for their meal to arrive, Oelsner took the fifth of five pictures: an East
German police station. It was presumably the waitress, who, at that point, contacted the
police. As the students were getting ready to pay and leave, East German police entered
and demanded to see their papers which they could not produce. Sellers and Oelsner were
then arrested and brought to the police station that Oelsner had just photographed.
Oelsner wrote that he and Sellers had not understood how seriously the Soviets took
unauthorized travel and that they had thought that if they were caught, they could say
they had mistakenly entered the Soviet zone and would simply be sent back across the
border.
In keeping with this plan, when the East German police searched and questioned
Sellers and Oelsner, they told the police that they had mistakenly entered the Soviet zone
and that they had been trying to go to a town the same size as Boizenburg in the British
zone that is also south of Büchen called Lauenburg. Despite this explanation, the local
police called the Soviets who sent two soldiers who again searched their belongings.
Sellers and Oelsner were then taken to the Boizenburg jail. From there, the Soviets, who
had evidently learned the general location of the bicycles, took the two Americans there,
demanding that they reveal the bicycles’ exact location. When they refused, they were
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taken back to the jail. During this exercise, the Soviet soldiers repeated the word spion,
German for spy, indicating how they had already assessed Sellers and Oelsner. Sellers
eventually revealed the location of their bicycles and they were taken from their cells
again. After a painstakingly detailed inventory of their things, Sellers and Oelsner were
transported by truck to Schwerin, the Soviets’ regional headquarters.
That night, Sellers was questioned for two hours and Oelsner was questioned for
nearly six. From this point on August 1st until August 8th, Sellers and Oelsner were kept
apart. The pictures which Oelsner took played a large role in the Soviets initial
assessment that Sellers and Oelsner might be spies. In their questioning of Oelsner, which
both he and State Department documents termed an “interrogation,” Soviet soldiers asked
him a number of questions about his alleged spy activity, including “Why did you come
to take pictures of our fortifications?” and “By whom were you sent?”. They told him
“We know that you are a spy,” and sometimes made threats such as “Do you wish to see
your family again?”36 To the Soviets, the fact that Oelsner took these pictures was not
compatible with Sellers and Oelsner having entered the zone innocently and accidentally.
They were right that Sellers and Oelsner had actually entered the zone purposefully, but
they had trouble accepting the more innocent explanation that in the poor, run down postwar Soviet zone, the larger and more notable Soviet buildings simply made the most
interesting pictures. The incriminating situation, the larger atmosphere of spying and USSoviet tension, and Sellers’ and Oelsner’s dubious explanation all contributed to the
assessment that Sellers and Oelsner might have been spies.
The following day, on August 1st, Sellers was questioned. Meanwhile, Oelsner
broke the light fixture in his cell and otherwise resisted his captors. Sellers and Oelsner
were transported separately to another jail, which they would later learn was in
Magdeburg. Sellers was transported by truck with the bikes and a German woman, while
Oelsner was transported blindfolded and handcuffed in a car. It seems from the difference
in their treatment that, at this point, Oelsner was the subject of more suspicion than
Sellers, something that would seem to be borne out over the next few days, when both
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would be subjected to further questioning. Oelsner was questioned once on August 2nd
and twice on August 3rd, and Sellers was questioned on August 2nd and August 4th. On
the 2nd, Oelsner, confronted with the discrepancy that Sellers had admitted to their
willfully staying in the Soviet zone while he maintained it was a mistake, admitted that
their presence in the Soviet zone was intentional. He was also asked more questions that
indicated that he was suspected of spying, and was told that lying carried a three-year
prison sentence. In the first questioning session the next day, in addition to more
questions about spying, Oelsner was threatened with a trial and told that he could be sent
to Siberia. In the second session, he was asked about his pictures, which had been
developed. Three of the five were of important Soviet buildings with a fourth of the
German police station! Oelsner was again told that he was a spy and was asked
repeatedly to sign an inaccurate statement, which he refused to do. On August 4th, Sellers
was questioned for a long time about whether Oelsner could have been a spy while he
was not; the Soviets had apparently concluded by now that Sellers was definitely not a
spy. Sellers later recounted to family that at some point during these days of questioning,
he was asked about esoteric mathematical principles to test his claim that he was a
student of mathematics. On August 5th, Oelsner signed an accurate statement about his
activities and on August 8th, Sellers and Oelsner were reunited and allowed to live
together in an above-ground room rather than in cells below ground level. These
developments show that Sellers and Oelsner were no longer suspected of being spies.
On August 10th, having asked to talk to one of the higher ranking Soviet officers
the day before, Oelsner was brought to the Soviet major, who told him that US military
authorities would be informed of their detention. In fact, US authorities were not told
until August 24th. Oelsner’s questions about his and Sellers’ release were “met with the
complacent ‘You will see’ or ‘That is unimportant.’”37 According to Oelsner’s account,
“the Major definitely inferred that we were no longer considered spies,” confirming what
seemed to have been the Soviet assessment since August 5th.
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The United Press (UP) later reported that two weeks after Sellers’ and Oelsner’s
disappearance, Major General Mihail Dratvin, the Deputy Soviet Military Governor,
demanded on or around August 13th that the US return three Soviet army deserters
believed to be in an Allied zone.38
Meanwhile in Magdeburg, on August 16th, Sellers and Oelsner committed what
was to be deemed significant misbehavior. They had been tossing a metal cup around and
had just attempted a backflip when a stern faced officer entered their room. Oelsner was
surprised and said ‘hello’ in Spanish, which caused him to chuckle. The officer took this
as an affront and began to talk furiously in Russian and to gesticulate ridiculously.
Having been under considerable strain for over two weeks, this sight was amusing and
Sellers and Oelsner began laughing uncontrollably, laughing the “furious” officer “out of
the room.”39 The following day, as punishment, they were separated, taken back to their
small, underground cells, put in solitary confinement for the next eighteen days, and had
their food portions reduced.
Back in the United States, the missing students and the efforts to locate them
began to attract significant media attention, which would continue throughout their time
in East Germany and into the weeks following their return. On August 15th, newspapers
around the US began to carry an Associated Press (AP) story about the students’
disappearance. The following day, Brigadier General Norman Schwarzkopf Sr., Deputy
Provost Marshal for the American Zone of Occupation, ordered a search throughout all
the Allied zones.40 There was increasing speculation that Sellers and Oelsner might be in
the Soviet Zone but this was not yet known.41 Five days later, on August 20th, US High
Commissioner John J. McCloy ordered a “top priority” search which was even reported
by the Times of London among many other publications.42

38

“Russians to Free 2 Americans.”
Oelsner.
40
“Missing Lad In Germany Not B.H. Boy.”
41
“Missing N.Y. Shipping Scion Feared Held in Red Germany.”
42
“Hunt for 2 Americans Lost In Germany Given Priority.” and “News In Brief, American Youths
Missing In Germany.”
39

33

The US government first learned that Sellers and Oelsner were in Soviet custody
through a German informant on August 22nd.43 An inquiry into Sellers’ and Oelsner’s
situation sent to the Soviets by the USMLM on August 16th had not received a response.
On September 24th, two days after the US learned of Sellers’ and Oelsner’s situation
from the informant, Soviet officials confirmed to their US counterparts that they were
holding Sellers and Oelsner, a fact which the State Department was then able to confirm
to the press.44 Sometime between the 24th and 26th, the USMLM received word from
Major Maslen, a Soviet liaison officer from the USMLM’s Soviet counterpart, that
Sellers and Oelsner would be returned upon the release of the three Soviet army
deserters. US officials did not disclose the contents of this communication to the public,
but the cable was read to the press by Oelsner’s older brother. Oelsner’s brother
characterized Sellers and Oelsner as “hostages,” a characterization that was widely
adopted by the American press.45 Lester Sellers, the young Sellers’ father, cited the same
cable, although he was hesitant to adopt the same characterization.46 Although a state
department spokesman was not able to confirm that Sellers and Oelsner were being held
as hostages, on August 29th, CBS News reported47 General George P. Hays as saying
that the Soviets had officially referred to Sellers and Oelsner as hostages. American
officials clearly conceived of Sellers and Oelsner and hostages.
In a press conference on August 31st, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had the
following response to a question about hostage trading in relation to the Sellers-Oelsner
case:
Journalist: “Mr. Secretary, there are some suggestions from Vienna that
we might have kept this Russian, Barsov, for trading purposes with some of
the people that they are holding of ours. What is our attitude on [the] trading
of hostages and that sort of thing?”
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Secretary Acheson: “Well, the attitude of this government is that it does
not engage in that sort of thing. Mr. Barsov wanted to return to the Soviet
Union. He had committed no crime against the United States. We do not
engage in holding people and trading them off against other people who
have also committed no crimes. Our attitude toward the two students who
are being held by the Soviet authorities in the Soviet zone of Germany is
that it is an illegal, outrageous and improper thing to do. It is true that these
students had passports and were improperly in the zone but they are young
people who were doing no harm. Nobody accused them of being spies.
Therefore, they should have promptly been put over the border into the
American zone. But we would not seize some person who[m] we had no
legal right to hold in order to barter him off against one of our own
citizens.”48
On September 4th, Sellers and Oelsner were removed from solitary confinement
and again allowed to live together in the room where they had lived before solitary
confinement. On September 5th, they were given shaving equipment and tools for other
self care, such as toothbrushes. On September 6th, Soviet military authorities permitted
Brigadier General W. W. Jr., chief of the USMLM at Potsdam, to visit Sellers and
Oelsner. They were not, however, permitted to talk privately and General Hess was not
able to give them any information about the prospects of their release. The Soviets did
not allow Sellers and Oelsner to write to their families. According to Oelsner’s account,
the Soviets had only scheduled the meeting the previous day. General Hess verified their
identity and wanted to know how Sellers and Oelsner had been treated, as well what their
movements had been since they were detained. His visit explained their change in
condition during the prior two days. The Soviet officers present at the meeting said that
decisions about Sellers’ and Oelsner’s detention were to be made by higher authorities
and that meetings were to be scheduled through General Ivanov, the chief of staff of the
Soviet Forces in Germany.
On September 5th, the US renewed its demand that the Soviet Union release
Sellers and Oelsner. US High Commissioner John J. McCloy sent a letter to the Soviet
military governor of the Russian Zone, General Vassily I. Chuikov. McCloy and Chuikov
48
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outranked Hays, General Dratvin, and Maslen. Therefore, this letter was a diplomatic
escalation by the US and was portrayed as such in the American press. McCloy wrote:
No reply has been received by General Hays from General Dratvin in regard
to these individuals [Sellers and Oelsner]. I feel that you may wish to know
that the detention of these two individuals by the Soviet military authorities
has resulted in wide publicity in the United States and is creating a very bad
reaction against the Soviet Union among the people of the United States.
The arbitrary detention of these two individuals by the Soviet military
authorities for no other reason than their lack of proper documentation has
created the impression that the Soviet military authorities are holding these
two individuals as hostages for the return of deserters from the Soviet army.
It is requested that you give this matter your personal attention and effect
the release of these two individuals without further delay.49
This letter was widely covered in the American press on September 10th with
newspapers around the country running the AP and UP stories.50
Soviet officials never informed Sellers and Oelsner if and when they would be
released. They were never told why they continued to be held. Beyond the lack of
information, their inquiries were derided and deemed misbehavior while comments by
Soviet officials made it seem as though their detention would continue for a long time.
This condition led them to take matters into their own hands and they hatched a plan of
escape. They would quickly overpower their guards, leave the commandant, and make
their way to the British zone. It’s unclear why they thought this plan had any chance of
success.
Sellers and Oelsner were visited again on September 12th, though this time by an
American colonel instead of General Hess. They were reprimanded by the American
colonel for their behavior, a fact which they were unsure how to interpret, although
Oelsner wrote that he later realized that this was an attempt by the colonel to placate his
Russian counterparts and to obtain a more favorable outcome. Following this meeting,
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Sellers and Oelsner decided to postpone their escape plan until they could interpret the
significance of the meeting.
In the latter half of September, nearing two months in Soviet custody, hearing no
further word from American officials, and experiencing no material change in their
position, Sellers and Oelsner became desperate enough to put their escape plan into
action. The relatively mild response by the Soviets to their escape attempt shows how
much their situation had changed. On September 20th, after Sellers and Oelsner had been
overpowered while violently assaulting their guards, the only sanction they received was
the removal of the chairs and chess set from their room as well as security measures, such
as having their windows boarded up and their being forced to use a pan in their cell
instead of being allowed to leave their room to go to the bathroom. This is striking in
contrast to earlier in their detention when they were placed in solitary confinement in
underground cells and given very little food for much lesser offenses. Most notably, they
were not physically abused by any Soviet soldiers, despite the violence the soldiers had
received at their hands. This suggests that, by that time, the young men’s release was
imminent, and the Soviets did not want them to show any visible signs of mistreatment.51
Sellers and Oelsner were released to General Hess on September 28th. He brought
them to Hamburg where they were questioned by US officials before returning to the US.
The Soviets only informed them of their release within an hour of their being handed
over. The only other indication they received was the return of their clothes that morning.
The US government vehemently protested Sellers’ and Oelsner’s detention
following their release. A week afterwards, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union in
Moscow, Alan G. Kirk, delivered a protest letter to the Soviet Foreign Office. The letter
described the treatment of Oelsner and Sellers as “be[ing] in shocking contravention to
the most elementary standards of international decency.” It went on to raise “the most
energetic protest” against the treatment of American citizens in Soviet custody in the
Soviet Zone of Germany more broadly, noting other cases of detention and mistreatment,
and declared that the US “expects that those Soviet officials who are responsible for these
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acts will be given instructions to prevent a recurrence of such incidents.” The letter
concluded by “further insist[ing] that the elementary rights of its citizens be observed in
the future in accordance with the international comity which governs the conduct of all
civilized states.”52 Kirk’s letter was the last event of the Sellers-Oelsner case.
It seems clear that after initially detaining Sellers and Oelsner on the good faith
suspicion that they were spies and then quickly determining they were not, the Soviet
Union decided that continuing to hold Sellers and Oelsner could be a useful form of
leverage. Whether the Soviet Union had the return of their deserters in mind all along,
whether they wanted to find out whether the Soviet deserters were in American hands or
not, whether they wanted to test American willingness to engage in hostage diplomacy at
the beginning of the Cold War as each side was trying to learn where the other would
give, or whether it was some combination of these objectives, the Soviet Union attempted
to hold Sellers and Oelsner as hostages. The Soviets may have thought that the longer
they held Sellers and Oelsner, the more pressure would mount and thus that the US would
be more likely to make concessions. It seems, however, that obtaining the release of
Sellers and Oelsner and not incentivizing future hostage taking by not acceding to Soviet
demands was a much higher priority for the US than extracting concessions from the US
was a priority for the Soviets. This reading of the situation is supported by the seniority
of the US officials concerned with the case compared to the lesser seniority of their
Soviet counterparts combined with US insistence that Sellers and Oelsner be released and
that the US would not engage in any “bartering” as Secretary Acheson put it. Whether the
Soviets simply sought to test American boundaries and had already accomplished their
goals or whether they had been hoping to extract concessions, it seems that they
concluded that the costs to continuing to hold Sellers and Oelsner outweighed the
potential gains. Regardless, Sellers and Oelsner were held as hostages, were not always
treated well, and securing their release required significant effort, sometimes from the
highest levels of the American government.
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Chapter 5, The Coverage of their Case in the Media:
How the media relayed the events detailed in the previous chapter to the public is
crucial to understanding how the press coverage of the Sellers-Oelsner case would have
affected public opinion. The more anti-Soviet biases that were present in the coverage,
the more the case would have made people think badly of the Soviet Union. This chapter
first draws on Kriesberg’s work examining the biases that pervaded American press
coverage of the Soviet Union at the time and then assesses which of these biases were
present in the coverage of the Sellers-Oelsner case. In so doing, I draw on examples from
a few of the hundreds of newspaper articles about the case that I reviewed. This chapter
also examines where Americans got their information about the Soviet Union at the time.
A 1947 analysis53 of New York Times coverage of the Soviet Union between 1918
and 1946 found that while the paper’s reporting was consistently factual and its quality
high, there were ways in which the Times’ coverage was less favorable to the Soviet
Union than the most neutral coverage would have been. The analysis identified the
following trends in the following aspects of coverage. The first aspect is common themes
in the coverage’s content. Kriesberg found that when coverage of the Soviet Union was
negative, Soviet leaders were portrayed as “immoral and unethical” as well as “unjust,
unreasonable, and arbitrary,” the Soviet government was portrayed as representative of
the Russian people’s character as well as unlikely to succeed, the Soviet Union was
portrayed as a “predatory state,” and Soviet leaders and people there were portrayed as
“enigmatic.” When coverage of the Soviet Union was positive, the Soviet Union’s
cooperation with the Allies against the Axis was reported, the Russian people were
portrayed as “resolute fighters,” and the Soviet nation was portrayed as enterprising and
forceful. In terms of the attention certain types of content received, Kriesberg found that
unfavorable news about the Soviet Union received far more coverage than favorable
news, favorable news about the Soviet Union received far more coverage when USSoviet interests were parallel, and “news about the Soviet Union [was] given relatively
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little attention unless it suggest[ed] a crisis in Soviet affairs or US-Soviet relations.”
Lastly, Kriesberg found that while methodological flaws in the Times’ coverage were
quite rare, they consistently cut in the anti-Soviet direction. Six reoccurring flaws were
headlines that did not reflect the content of the story, stories that drew on questionable
sources of information, the use of emotionally loaded words to describe the Soviet Union,
“climactic reporting” that implied crisis in Soviet affairs, reporting that was
“pollyannaish” about US-Soviet relations, and usually negative “opportunistic reporting”
which was more timely than it was newsworthy.
As far as coverage of my case study is concerned, newspaper coverage typically
occurred around major developments in the case. Thus, coverage was regular between
mid-August and early-October of 1949. While the coverage consisted almost entirely of
news stories (rather than opinion pieces) which accurately reflected the information that
the US government had at the time and which was almost always accurate as far as my
sources show, the coverage was not without less than strictly journalistic bias. Since the
vast majority of newspapers printed content from the AP and similar national news
organizations, these papers had much more leeway in the headlines they applied rather
than in the text of the stories they published. Headlines expressed bias in a variety of
ways. First, the Soviets were frequently referred to with somewhat derogatory nicknames
such as “Reds” and “Russ.” Headlines also often chose dramatic and somewhat
moralizing language over purely descriptive language. For example, an August, 23rd
headline in the Rochester, NY Democrat and Chronicle read “Reds Seize Two Yanks,
Germans Report”54 while a September, 28th headline in the Shamokin News-Dispatch
read “2 Youths Say Reds Held Them As Spies.”55 These headlines are dramatic and
immediately cast the Soviet Union in an unfavorable light. The many readers who
probably read the headlines and not the stories under them would have come away with
the impression that an evil adversary was not treating one’s own well without knowing
what had taken place. Headlines also frequently referred to Sellers and Oelsner as
“youths,” “lads,” or “college boys,” language which carries connotations of vulnerability
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and innocence that likely cause more intense negative reactions against the Soviets. Some
newspapers had much more neutrally worded headlines. These provide a striking
contrast. For instance, concerning the same two developments in the case, an August,
23rd headline in the Detroit Free Press read “U.S. Bicyclists Reported in Russian
Hands”56 and September, 28th headline in the Dothan Eagle read “Russians Release Two
U.S. Students.”57
Beyond the framing of stories with the tone and diction of headlines, newspapers
sometimes emphasized the most sensational and abusive facts in their headlines, leading
to headlines whose content did not match the day’s primary story. For example, on the
28th of September, the day Sellers and Oelsner were released to American officials and
interviewed, The Bakersfield Californian ran the headline “Students Tell of Being Held
in Russ Dungeons.”58 It is misleading to emphasize that they were held in “dungeons”
and to adopt that characterization without making it clear that it was a word used by
Oelsner in interviews to describe where they had been held. Even more than the phrase
‘underground cells,’ “dungeons” has especially evil, fantastical, and medieval
connotations. Their release which was the day’s main news and thus the most natural
content for headlines was at most implicit in the headline. Again, the Dothan Eagle
headline from the same day provides a stark contrast. While the AP’s reporting was
consistently high quality, it did magnify Soviet transgressions and downplay the illegality
of Sellers' and Oelsner’s actions as well as the suspicion that those actions would have
reasonably engendered. Thus, the content of the coverage was ever so slightly biased
against the Soviet Union as well. The content of newspapers that did not rely on the AP
and wrote their own coverage, such as big national newspapers and local newspapers in
the communities where Sellers and Oelsner came from, largely resembles the content of
the AP stories and usually used headlines which were neither the most nor the least
neutral. This type of coverage of the Soviet Union was typical of the time and is
consistent with academic analysis of such coverage.
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The trends of Soviets being portrayed as unjust and arbitrary, the Soviet Union
being predatory, unfavorable news getting more attention, crisis moments getting more
attention, headlines not always matching their stories, and loaded language that
researchers found in Times coverage manifested themselves consistently in the coverage
of the Sellers-Oelsner case. The similarity between the press coverage of the SellersOelsner case and other coverage of the Soviet Union suggests that other similar events
would have been covered in much the same manner. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect
that the effects of similarly covered events on public opinion would have been the same
and that the cumulative effect of such events on public opinion would have been
substantial. Thus, the more of these events that there were, the more the American public
would have been exposed to coverage casting the Soviet Union as a cruel, dangerous, and
immoral adversary that was antithetical to their values. The next chapter will examine the
effects of that coverage on broad trends in public opinion.
The public was familiar with the Sellers-Oelsner case through the extensive
coverage that it and the US government’s responses received in the American press.
Thus, many Americans who regularly read newspapers would have been familiar with it.
While newspapers in Philadelphia and near Oyster Bay, NY where Sellers and Oelsner
respectively grew up covered the story the most, it was covered by newspapers around
the country through the AP, UP, and INS. Furthermore, it was covered in national
newspapers such as the New York Times and Washington Post. I rely almost exclusively
on newspaper coverage for my analysis of how the media covered their case. This is due
in large part to the difficulty of accessing other forms of media. I do not think there are
significant methodological issues with a focus on newspapers. One reason is that
newspapers as a media source were better suited to coverage of the Sellers-Oelsner case
than their non-newspaper counterparts. Rarely was the Sellers-Oelsner case one of the
day’s top five stories. Thus, a radio or television program only covering the day’s top
stories would likely have neglected it. Likewise, a weekly or less frequently published
periodical magazine with a limited number of longer stories about major events and
trends would have also tended to neglect the story.
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The other main reason that I think I can responsibly rely on newspaper coverage
is that at that time, Americans got their news from newspapers far more than any other
medium. This finding comes from a 1958 study59 by Mackinnon et al. which found that
when asked where Americans go their information about Russia, 36.5% mentioned
newspapers first. The second most mentioned source was “Reading” which was
mentioned by 12.1% of respondents and likely included, at least in part, newspapers.
Furthermore, many of the respondents who first cited books or television (which was
even less prominent in 1949 than it was in 1958) probably also read newspapers.
Therefore, if anything, one would expect that newspapers were even more dominant at
the time of the Sellers-Oelsner case than they were in 1958. In short, newspapers were
both by far the most influential source of information about the Soviet Union as well the
best suited to cover the Sellers-Oelsner case. Finally, the evidence indicates that insofar
as other media covered the Sellers-Oelsner case, that coverage was very similar to the
newspaper coverage. For instance, reports by CBS journalist Bill Downs closely match
the newspaper coverage.60
Chapter 6, The Influence of Events and their Coverage on Public and Elite Opinion:
Drawing on the previous chapter’s analysis of the media coverage that the SellersOelsner case received, this chapter will examine the two sets of opinion which influenced
the Cold War from the American side: elite and public opinion of the Soviet Union and
the Soviet-American relationship. As noted previously, public opinion of the Soviet
Union soured significantly between the end of WWII and the early fifties. While
dominant opinion among foreign policy elites did not undergo the same fundamental shift
after 1947 that public opinion did because it had soured much more quickly, it was
nonetheless strengthened and augmented by new events. This chapter will draw on social
psychology to examine how elite and public opinion, especially concerning foreign
affairs, are formed, and will assess the likely qualitative effects of the Sellers-Oelsner
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case on these sets of opinion. Furthermore, it will posit that the relationship between the
Sellers-Oelsner case and public and elite opinion would have also been observed in many
other cases during the same period of time and therefore, that the cumulative effect of
these cases was likely significant. That magnitude in turn helps explain how and why this
type of event likely contributed to the overall changes in public and elite opinion that
occurred at the time. In doing so, this chapter will draw on the historical context, the
particular facts of the Sellers-Oelsner case, the changes in public opinion that took place
at the time, and the media coverage that their case received, all of which I detailed in the
preceding three chapters.
Civilian citizen-centered, highly charged events like the Sellers-Oelsner case
affected public and elite opinion in similar yet distinct ways. The connection between
these events and elite opinion is more straightforward. First, foreign policy elites,
especially those in government, are by definition interested in and paying close attention
to foreign policy events. Thus, those events contribute to how these elites think about
important foreign policy questions. For some elites, the effects are very direct because
those elites are either working on the specific event or are employed by an agency that is.
Not only would these elites be knowledgeable of and intellectually connected to the
events, but they would also be emotionally and personally connected to them, rendering
their conclusions even stronger and more personally influential. Employees at the State
Department, for instance, were not only driven by the information they consumed in the
media but also by their jobs. Those who worked on the Sellers-Oelsner case had the
experience of working to free innocent youths whose unnecessarily long detention
strained their families. Those employees whose job it was to correspond with Sellers’ and
Oelsner’s families would have experienced this the most acutely. Somewhat less
immediate but nonetheless far more personal than reading the news or discussing the
event at a Washington social gathering, every State Department employee had the
experience of their boss blasting Soviet behavior as “illegal, outrageous and improper.” It
defies common sense to think that hearing those words from one’s boss and the leader of
one’s agency would have no effect on one’s opinions and emotions. Over time with
experiences like this compounding each other, the effects were likely substantial. The
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same would have been true for Americans in political and military positions in Germany
and Moscow. In this vein, in his book about career State Department officials stationed in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Santis describes how quickly and enthusiastically
they responded to clear direction from department leadership.61 It seems likely that same
spirit would also have applied to somewhat less official directives.
Elite foreign policy opinion is driven, in large part, by general assessments of
foreign policy issues, such as the Soviet-American relationship, and by general
conceptions of other countries, such as the Soviet Union. Social psychologists, most
notably Deborah Larson, have applied psychology to understanding the formation of elite
opinion, specifically in the Cold War context. The author of Origins of Containment: a
Psychological Explanation and Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the
Cold War, Larson argues in both her books that for the Cold War to be fully explained,
the crucial decision makers and their rationales must be subjected to psychological
analysis. Political scientists, such as Ole Holsti, have similarly drawn heavily on
psychology to inform their analyses of the Cold War. The human mind, as Larson
explains in her article "The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy
Decision-Making,” is incapable of retaining all the information which it initially
possesses in its short-term memory.62 Therefore the brain takes specific inputs from one’s
short-term memory and translates them into less detailed conceptions and impressions
that are retained in one’s long-term memory. The composites of these conceptions and
impressions on a similar topic, combined with more specific pieces of information and
personal experiences, are called schemas. Describing this phenomenon Larson writes:
“Schemas include specific instances, exemplars, and analogies as well as the more
abstract knowledge found in belief systems. Schema theory recognizes that people
frequently approach problems not by applying abstract propositions but by drawing
examples from their experience.”63 In other words, in the foreign policy context, elites
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synthesize everything that they learn and experience into schemas which reflect their
reactions to the issues that they deal with.
Importantly, schemas create powerful frameworks for understanding the world
and for interpreting events. Therefore, it is quite clear how significant it would be
whether a schema is favorable to another country or not and whether a schema
understands a relationship as a struggle or a partnership. By the summer of 1949 with the
Truman Doctrine two years earlier, the Berlin airlift earlier that year, and a struggle with
communism taking place across the globe, abstract belief systems conceiving of the
Soviet Union as an adversary would have been solidly in place among elites. In that way
all foreign policy elites would have already had some significant, relatively welldeveloped schema in place. Nevertheless, the Cold War was new enough that these
schemas probably did not yet contain as many specific instances and exemplars as they
eventually would a decade into the conflict. Furthermore, some schemas probably did not
yet include fully formed judgments of all the facets of the Soviet Union and SovietAmerican relations. Thus, in the summer of 1949, foreign policy elites were in the
process of refining and adding to their Cold War schemas.64 The events of the SellersOelsner case as well as the experiences of working on it are exactly the types of things
that would have helped build or comprise schemas.
It is clear what impacts the Sellers-Oelsner case would have had on schemas. It
would have reinforced schemas conceiving of the Soviet Union as cruel and unscrupulous
in its use of innocent and illegally detained students as attempted bargaining chips.
Relatedly, it would have furthered the idea that the Soviet Union could not be trusted to
abide by international laws and norms such as the principle of not detaining people
without charges. It also would have reinforced the idea that the Soviet Union was a threat
to the wellbeing of Americans arising from the poor treatment of Sellers and Oelsner.
More generally, it would have confirmed and deepened the existing schema that the
Soviet Union was an evil adversary and would have provided a very specific example
which an official might always have as part of their assessment of the Soviet Union.
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Many scholars, chief among them Holsti, have found that one crucial component
of foreign policy schemas is whether those schemas conceive of another country as ‘the
enemy.’65 The importance of schematic ‘enemy’ conceptions is that, as both Larson and
Holsti found, once another country is the ‘enemy,’ everything it does is seen according to
that schema, fairly or not.66 Thus once ‘enemy’ is part of a schema, it is persistent and
self-perpetuating; treating another country as an enemy eventually creates that reality,
whether it was fully there before or not. In addition, Stone et al. observed a very strong
tendency to always have an ‘enemy', finding that as soon as the Soviet Union collapsed,
American press coverage of China suddenly became less favorable, with China having
replaced the Soviet Union as the ‘enemy’ in that context.67 This finding about portrayals
of China shows how central having an ‘enemy’ is to schematic thinking. Events such as
the Sellers-Oelsner case, in which innocent American citizens were unnecessarily
wronged and harshly treated by the Soviet Union, would have served to strengthen the
Soviet Union as ‘enemy’ element of schemas.
Another dimension to elite opinion is that of moral perceptions. In the context of
the foreign affairs bureaucracy amidst the Cold War, moral contempt for the Soviet
Union and its system was influential.68 It buoyed motivation to defeat the adversary,
diminished respect for the adversary, and made the adversary seem more threatening.69
For instance, John Foster Dulles contemptuously wrote that “Soviet Communism starts
with an atheistic, Godless premise. Everything else flows from there.”70Emotionally it
caused anger, resentment, and disgust, none of which furthered a more amicable
relationship with the Soviet Union. Nolan shows how much Soviet treatment of
American citizens under its control disgusted and angered high ranking American
officials. He quotes Averell Harriman, who at the time was overseeing the administration
of the Marshall Plan and who had very senior roles in both the Truman and Kennedy
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administrations,71 as saying “I am outraged … that the Soviet Government has
declined … that our contact officers be permitted to go immediately to points where our
prisoners are first collected, to evacuate our prisoners, particularly the sick.”72 Even more
starkly, Foy Kolher, an American chargé in Moscow who would later serve as an
ambassador during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, wrote back to the US that
“the Soviet dictatorship is as ruthlessly destructive of personal liberties as any known to
history” and proceeded to compare the Soviet Union to Nazi Germany.73 These are just
two of many expressions of these sentiments.
In the Sellers-Oelsner case, the Soviet Union subjected the two Americans to
harsh conditions and subjected both them and their families to considerable emotional
and psychological hardship for the purpose of extracting concessions. I was not able to
obtain any private conversations expressing the same sentiments as Kohler and Acheson
for the Sellers-Oelsner case, though these sentiments come through strongly in the public
statements US officials made about the case such as Secretary Acheson’s press
conference and Ambassador Kirk’s letter. Furthermore, I suspect that if I had been able to
get Department of Defense documents in time or if more State Department documents
still existed, I would have found records of American officials expressing the same
sentiments in private that they expressed in public. In Nolan’s cases as well instances
related in The Diplomacy of Silence, those sentiments were expressed in private.
Just as in Nolan’s case studies, large numbers of officials worked on the SellersOelsner case.
The size of the list of high ranking political and military officials who were involved in
the Sellers-Oelsner case and whom it would have given another negative experience to
build schemas disfavorable to the Soviet Union demonstrates just how much of the
bureaucracy the case affected. These officials include: Secretary of State Acheson, Lt
Gen George P. Hays the High Commissioner for the US Occupation Zone in Germany,
Maj Gen Schwarzkopf the provost marshal for the US sector, Robert Murphy a political
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advisor on Germany who would go on to serve as an ambassador to Belgium and Japan
and an undersecretary of state, Alan G. Kirk, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union in
Moscow, Brig Gen Walter W Hess the Chief of U.S. Military Liaison Mission to Soviet
Zone in Germany, James Riddleberger, a foreign service officer who would go on to lead
the Bureau of German affairs as well as serve as an assistant secretary of state and
ambassador to three countries, and John J. McCloy the Military Governor and High
Commissioner for West Germany who would go to advise every president through
Reagan. Furthermore, this already substantial list, which I compiled from mentions of
these officials in newspaper articles and State Department documents, understates the
reach of the case. It is by no means exhaustive, failing to include young officials who had
more junior positions at the time but who would go on to inhabit higher ranking
positions, officials who did not have public facing roles such as advisors to Acheson in
Washington, and officials who likely worked on the case but do not happen to appear in
any of the documents I had gained access to such as Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs George Perkins.
Since the influence of these events on the Cold War’s development depends on
their effects compounding, it is important to note that not only did similar events occur
again and again, but many of the same officials who featured in Nolan’s cases also
featured in the Sellers-Oelsner case. They include Murphy, Acheson, and Hays on the
American side and Dratvin on the Soviet side. For these American officials, the Soviet
maltreatment of Americans was a consistent pattern rather than a single occurrence, the
handling of which by their Soviet counterparts was always the same. This is expressed in
Ambassador Kirk’s letter protesting Sellers’ and Oelsner’s detention and treatment.
While the letter focuses primarily on the Sellers-Oelsner case and was clearly prompted
by it, it refers to another specific cases as well as to a pattern of unacceptable Soviet
treatment of Americans:
The case of Oelsner and Sellers is only the latest of many that have occurred
in Germany. Circumstances vary but the basic pattern is the same. United
States citizens, whether civilian or military, are arrested, held for long
periods of time, sometimes miserably mistreated, and eventually released,
49

without charges or apologies. The recent case of Pvt. John J. Sienkiewicz,
a United States soldier who escaped on Sept, 16, 1949, from a prison in the
Soviet sector of Berlin after ten months of imprisonment under brutal and
uncivilized conditions, is another illustration in point.74
The pattern that this letter refers to is a very narrow category of event that would include
neither Nolan’s case studies nor events like the 1951 conviction and two year
imprisonment of the AP’s Prague bureau chief, William B. Oatis, on bogus espionage
charges, another case that received considerable attention.75 That this narrow category got
its own high profile response demonstrates both how many of these cases there were and
the very adverse reaction that they provoked among American foreign policy elites. Since
the type of cases in this narrower category are understudied, they are absent from the
historical literature and it is difficult to know exactly how frequently they occurred. What
is most important, however, is the American perception that they were a very regular
occurrence. Furthermore, the fact that the Sellers-Oelsner case prompted Kirk’s protest
letter indicates that it was seen as an especially significant case by American officials and
suggests that it would have left some sort of lasting impression on them, likely as a part
of their larger Cold War schemas. Thus, the significance of the case suggests that it is
especially worthy of study to better understand both Soviet-American relations and their
development at this time.
In short, while elite opinion was significantly ahead of public opinion and did not
undergo very much change after 1947 in terms of how the Soviet Union and SovietAmerican relations were fundamentally viewed,76 it was early enough for elite opinion to
be subject to new effects. Elite schemas were not yet either as flush with examples of
grievances or as intensely loathing as they would become. Events like the Sellers-Oelsner
case which were specific manifestations of larger assessments of the Soviet Union and
which led to scathing moral judgements of the Soviets in very concrete terms likely
played a significant role in the development of certain facets of elites’ schemas. Though
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Nolan does not employ the schema concept in discussing the effects of his case studies on
foreign policy elites, this finding perfectly matches Nolan’s finding that cases of Soviet
maltreatment of innocent Americans made elite American views of the Soviet Union
more negative and augmented the Cold War.
The connection between events like the Sellers-Oelsner case and public opinion is
more complicated and less direct. As opposed to foreign policy elites, it is neither a given
that the public pays attention to nor that it particularly cares about foreign policy events
and questions which do not directly affect it (major wars with Americans fighting and
dying are one of the clear exceptions). Additionally, unlike the elites who comprise the
bureaucracy which responds to such events, since there is no direct relationship between
the public and the events, the public relies on news coverage to mediate events for it.77
Therefore it is crucial that the Sellers-Oelsner case received the large volume of media
coverage that I analyzed in the previous chapter and that that coverage came in mediums
to which many American paid close attention. Thus, the media determined not only what
information the public received also the tone with which that information was conveyed.
According to the framework for understanding the role of public opinion in US
foreign policy generated by Powlick et al, the general public does not usually pay close
attention to foreign policy matters though those matters do sometimes break through and
then command considerable attention and media coverage.78 Sellers’ and Oelsner’s
mysterious disappearance and the significant amount of press coverage that it received
likely peaked public interest initially. Once their case had broken through and
commanded attention, that in turn brought more coverage and more attention, as well as
attention from relevant elites who then had to take managing public sentiment into
account when crafting their own responses. The dramatic nature of the Sellers-Oelsner
case, centered around the whereabouts and wellbeing of two young Americans, made it a
much more compelling story than a similarly high-profile diplomatic disagreement would
have been, a reason that the average American might have followed and been invested in
the case. That interest and subsequent attention was necessary for the case to have had
77
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any significant influence on public opinion. Sellers said that in the period immediately
following his return, he was sometimes recognized as one of the two youths who had
been imprisoned in East Germany and that many people were familiar with the case.79
His experience is further indication that the Sellers-Oelsner case had, in fact, broken
through.
The relationship between media coverage and public opinion has been the subject
of a significant amount of research, sometimes specifically in the Cold War context.
Studies have consistently found that media coverage affects public opinion, both in terms
of the media informing what issues people are thinking about80 and what people think
about particular issues. Two types of relationships emerge. One is that themes in media
coverage pertaining to certain foreign policy issues affect the public's views on those
issues.81 The other is that media coverage creates general underlying impressions
amongst the public and then, when the public considers a given foreign policy issue, its
views of that issue are informed by the underlying impressions that have developed over
time.82 These dynamics are potentially complementary and the ultimate opinions of
media consumers are likely a product of both. Both dynamics underscore the influence
that media coverage has on public opinion.
Munton, a Canadian Cold War scholar, studied the former dynamic. Looking at
coverage of nuclear arms and arms control in the Globe and Mail, Canada’s preeminent
newspaper, he found a strong correlation between the media presenting increased military
strength as furthering security and public support for Canada acquiring nuclear weapons,
especially among those who paid closer attention to media coverage, strongly suggesting
that media coverage was causing their beliefs to change. When themes in media coverage
changed and arms control efforts were portrayed as furthering security, public support for
arms control increased, again disproportionately among those paying close attention to
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media coverage.83 American scholars have found similar relationships between media
coverage and public opinion.84
The second, more indirect dynamic, namely that media coverage generates
general impressions that in turn affect public opinion of particular foreign policy issues,
is more relevant to the Sellers-Oelsner case in which press stories concerned the Cold
War but did not explicitly address larger policy issues. Hurwitz et al. put this theory to
the test using detailed polling data. Drawing on psychology that I discussed in relation to
elite opinion, they propose that similar to elites creating schemas, “in their [the public’s]
need to simplify the international environment, individuals rely on more general, abstract
beliefs and orientations to evaluate specific foreign issues.”85 In keeping with this
dynamic, they conclude that their “results suggest that beliefs about the basic nature of
the Soviet Union operate as central premises in mass belief systems in foreign affairs.”86
Hurwitz et al. asked poll respondents about their underlying impressions of the
Soviet Union, namely whether it is trustworthy and whether it poses a threat to the US.
They also asked respondents generally about militarism and containment postures,
whether respondents had a “preference for an assertive stance emphasizing military
strength” and whether they “believe it is necessary to limit the influence of communism
and the Soviet Union” respectively.87 Lastly, they tested respondents' support for specific
foreign policy positions such as increasing defense spending, aiding the contras, and
sending American troops to central America to counter communism. Their findings were
statistically very robust. Both respondents who did not trust the Soviet Union and those
who viewed it as a threat supported containment and militarism postures at much higher
rates. While Hurwitz et al. also polled other factors that might influence public opinion
such as party affiliation and level of patriotism among others, they found that,
irrespective of these other variables, lack of trust led to greater support for increased
defense spending and expanding the US nuclear arsenal, and that viewing the Soviet
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Union as a threat led to increased support for expanding the US nuclear arsenal, aiding
the Contras, and especially sending troops to central America.88 Especially for the intents
and purposes of this chapter, their keynote finding is that general conceptions of the
Soviet Union directly affect support for particular policies.
Relatedly, whether the public thinks regularly about an issue is almost as
important for that issue’s salience as what people actually think of that issue. Recently,
Carmichael et al studied the relationship between media coverage and public concern
about climate change. In keeping with the literature that they reviewed, they found that
concern rose dramatically as the volume and frequency of media coverage increased.89
Watt et al. found that the increased salience of issues after media coverage is temporary.90
Their findings and those of others91 make clear the importance of regular coverage for an
issue to remain salient.
I will now apply these findings about media coverage and public opinion to the
Sellers-Oelsner case and its coverage. It defies all logic to think that the detention and
maltreatment of two American college students by the Soviet Union would not have
made the Soviet Union seem more threatening, an impression that the majority of
Americans would come to have.92 Similarly, it is almost unimaginable that the Soviets’
refusal to disclose their detention of Sellers and Oelsner during McCloy’s top-priority
search would not have made the Soviet Union seem more untrustworthy. Combined with
Hurwitz et al.’s research, those effects should have translated into some amount of
increased support for more aggressive Cold War policies. During the two-month span in
which the case unfolded, there were seven developments which prompted fresh rounds of
press coverage. Averaging almost a major development per week, the regularity of the
coverage would have kept not only the case but the broader reactions it engendered
towards the Soviet Union in the public consciousness for an extended period of time,
increasing their salience as the literature suggests. That extended salience would have in
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turn made the issue of Soviet transgressions against Americans a more important issue to
the public.
Furthermore, the personal, citizen-centered nature of the Sellers-Oelsner case
likely made it much more impactful in terms of the public drawing negative moral
conclusions about the Soviet Union. The case was the polar opposite of intellectually
geopolitical. One can easily imagine a man reading the paper at breakfast and saying to
his wife ‘It’s a shame the horrible things those damned Russians are doing to our boys.’
That reaction would be indicative of a strong, negative moral judgement of Soviet
behavior and would have contributed to the “images of the USSR”93 that Hurwitz et al.
found were central to the eventual formulation of concrete foreign policy views.
Many scholars including Hinckley and Oldendick et al. have noted how much the
Vietnam War fragmented both public and elite foreign policy opinion.94 Post-Vietnam,
large numbers of Americans became skeptical of American Cold War policy while others
remained supportive of it.95 It’s important that this fragmentation had not yet taken place
in 1949. In this pre-Vietnam era, the vast majority of the population would much more
frequently arrive at the same sets of views when presented with a given Cold War related
foreign policy question.96 Therefore it is likely that the vast majority of the public was
drawing the same conclusions from the Sellers-Oelsner case, making its effects on public
opinion much less ambiguous and much more potent in terms of pushing opinion strongly
in a single direction.97
I cannot definitively claim any certain effect of the Sellers-Oelsner case on public
opinion. I do, however, show what effect the case would have had and likely did have to
some small extent, an effect that would have been magnified to larger significance by
other similar cases having the same effects in the same period of time. Furthermore, the
effect that the Sellers-Oelsner case likely had fits the changes in public opinion taking
place at the time. Public opinion data shows a clear intensification of anti-Soviet
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sentiment between 1946 and the early 1950s.98 For instance, when asked in January of
1949 if they supported sending aid to Chiang Kai-shek' Nationalist Government, a
containment policy, only 29% of Americans supported it with 54% opposed. By January
of 1951, a mere two years later, 54% of poll respondents supported the policy with 32%
opposed.99 Therefore like elites, the public’s view increasingly became that the Soviet
Union was an evil and dangerous adversary that needed to be contained.
The scholarship and the historical evidence suggest that the Sellers-Oelsner case
would have likely had small effects on both public and elite opinion. They also suggest
that these effects would have been very similar to those of other similar events during the
same period of time, thereby together having a more significant effect on public and elite
opinion. The next chapter will examine what the ramifications of these effects would
have been on the Cold War.
Chapter 7, The Influence of Highly Charged, Personal Events on the Cold War:
In the previous chapter, I examined theories of elite and public opinion formation
and applied those theories, as well as empirical research by scholars on the same topics,
to the Sellers-Oelsner case. In doing so, I showed why their case and other similar events
would likely have made elite and public opinion slightly more hostile to the Soviet
Union. Building on the previous chapter, this chapter will explore the theories and
empirical findings which connect elite and public opinion to concrete policy decisions. It
is impossible to say exactly how much any one factor such as hard security concerns or
opposing societal systems, let alone any type of event, contributed to the development of
the Cold War. Nonetheless, it is both possible and productive to draw conclusions about
the qualitative impact of a certain type of event on the Cold War’s development.
Similarly, it’s possible and productive to draw conclusions about the approximate relative
magnitude of a particular type of event’s impact. To draw these conclusions, I will draw
on extensive scholarship showing how elite and public opinion impact foreign policy
98
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decisions and thus how effects on elite and public opinion arising from events like the
Sellers-Oelsner case would have likely impacted foreign policy decision making and by
extension, the Cold War.
I start with elite opinion by relaying how scholars have shown that it impacts
foreign policy decision making. Larson writes in her article “The Role of Belief Systems
and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making” that “Schema theory has the potential
to uncover the relationship between policymakers' knowledge and experience and their
decisions on current foreign policy issues.”100 In that article, she explains that schemas
affect how policy makers interpret events in turn influencing what policies seem to be the
rational responses. She also explains that when policy makers have gaps in their
understanding of a given situation as they frequently do, they use existing schemas to fill
in those gaps, which can lead to schemas guiding policy making in place of full
situational analysis. This can lead to the pursuit of policies that don’t best fit a given
situation and which perpetuate a given schema. Yet another effect of schemas is that once
they are entrenched, while they are still subject to change, they can lead to the dismissal
of countervailing evidence. Finally, she explains that schemas can affect policy makers’
memories in that what they remember fits their schema rather than reflecting actually
what happened. The effect is that policy makers can exit situations drawing the wrong
lessons.101
In her two books about Cold War history, Larson chronicles how elite schemas
and their elements affected foreign policy making.102 Her understanding of the effects of
schemas and their elements on policy making is widely shared though she has articulated
the theory most explicitly and comprehensively, which is why I’ve focused so heavily on
her work. Hurwitz et al., Holsti, and George, among many others, have all applied similar
theories and observed similar effects.103 In other words, the schemas that policy makers
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develop inform the policy decisions they make and can be used to show the likely effects
on policy of events that contributed to the formation of those schemas.
Examining the impact of belief systems and national images, both critical
elements of schemas, on foreign policy, Ole Holsti uses John Foster Dulles, secretary of
state from 1952-59, as a case study. He shows that Dulles’ distrust of the Soviet Union
ran so deep that he even viewed reductions in the size of the Soviet army with
suspicion.104 Dulles was one of the foremost architects of American Cold war policy
during the 1950s, so much so that in relation to the Cold war, the Eisenhower
administration has been referred to as the “Eisenhower-Dulles”105 administration, despite
Richard Nixon having been vice president. Therefore, the shape of his schemas had a
large impact on American Cold War policy, and by extension, the Cold War. Dulles’
distrust of the Soviet Union and thus its negative effects on the Soviet-American
relationship are in keeping with Larson's analysis of the effects of mistrust on the part of
the larger American foreign affairs apparatus at the time. In her book Anatomy of
mistrust: U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War, she found that a lack of mutual trust
between the superpowers increased confrontation and decreased collaboration on issues
such as arms control.106 Hoslsti’s example seems to explain the state of the world at the
time. Until détente began in the late sixties, the relationship between the US and the
Soviet Union that had deteriorated so much after World War II continued to be very poor.
During this period, which culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, limited
progress on arms control was made slowly and painstakingly, as evidenced by the time
and difficulty of negotiating the 1963 Test Ban Treaty.
Though no one has conducted a similar psychology-based analysis focused on
Secretary Acheson specifically, he held the same position in government and played a
very important role in the Truman administration’s Cold War policy, very similar to the
role that Dulles played in the Eisenhower administration’ policy. Thus, the shape of his
schemas would also have likely had a significant effect on American Cold War policy
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and by extension the Cold War itself. I focus on Acheson because he was the most senior
official who was heavily involved in the Sellers-Oelsner case. In addition to the press
conference, that involvement is documented in internal cables that he regularly received
concerning developments in the case and asking him to sign off on steps that officials in
Germany were considering.107 The other American officials involved in the case would
have been affected in much the same way as Acheson and their schemas would have also
informed their policy making. Especially in the cases of those who held senior executive
positions within their respective domains such as McCloy, there was ample scope for
their schemas to have wide influence on how they conducted policy within those
domains.
Another instance in which the effects of elite schemas on Cold War foreign policy
preferences (and by extension choices) can be observed is at the conflict’s end. Peffley et
al.’s examination of changes to public enemy images, a crucial element of schemas,
inspired a near replication of their study, this time geared towards elites. Using polling
data from before and after the nuclear arms control summits of 1987 and 1988, Peffley et
al. had found that improvement in the public’s enemy images of the Soviet Union led to
support for lower defense spending and less aggressive military policy.108 Murray et al.
conducted almost the same research though they instead examined elites in the period
immediately after the Cold War ended. They researched the effects of the end of the
conflict on elite belief systems and found that even limited changes to enemy images in
those policymakers’ belief systems led to concrete changes in certain policy preferences,
such as decreased support for containment as well as less enthusiasm for high defense
spending.109 The result is that officials in influential positions who were subject to these
changes in preferences would have made less confrontational policy choices vis a vis the
Soviet Union/Russia. While the end of the Cold War is obviously a particularly stark
change in the situation on which people built schemas, it nonetheless illustrates the
powerful effects that schemas have on foreign policy choices and shows that foreign
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policy preferences change as schemas change. Russian/Soviet ability to obliterate the US
many times over did not change at all. Instead, it was changing schemas conceiving of
the Soviet Union/Russia as less threatening which led to different policy support. Thus, a
strong connection can be observed between schemas and foreign policy decisions.
I now apply these findings to the Sellers-Oelsner case. Insofar as events like the
Sellers-Oelsner case combined to make elite schemas towards the Soviet Union more
adversarial, as my analysis in the previous chapter suggests they did to some degree, then
they would have caused elite foreign policy makers to favor more aggressive policies as
the scholarship I’ve discussed so far in this chapter suggests. These elites would have
then taken more aggressive stances, both in the larger geopolitical context as well as in
their specific interactions with their Soviet counterparts. Therefore, I think that we can
reasonably expect that the composite effect of events like the Sellers-Oelsner would have
been to make the Cold War slightly more intense and slightly more adversarial.
Having assessed the impacts of changes in elite opinion on foreign policy, I turn
now to the effects of public opinion on foreign policy decision making. Public opinion
ultimately influences foreign policy through its effects on elite policy makers. Within the
study of the interplay between public opinion and elite opinion regarding foreign policy,
there are two schools of thought, namely democratic-responsiveness theory which holds
that foreign policy elites are impacted by the views of the public in the formation of
policy and also elite theory, which conversely holds that the views of the public are
influenced by those of elites. There is evidence to support both110 and as they are
definitely not mutually exclusive and only the former explains the influence of events on
foreign policy decisions, I will subsequently ignore the latter in this thesis other than to
make a few brief but relevant observations. The first is that insofar as elites are able to
exert some amount of influence over the public’s foreign policy views, that provides
reason for elites to pay attention to those views. Foyle and I share this supposition.111
Second, it gives them reason to take pre-existing alignment between public and elite
views seriously because insofar as those views are already aligned, elites are spared the
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time and effort of endeavoring to change the public’s views. Furthermore, the uncertainty
over whether elites will in fact be able to change public opinion in a given situation
should make them hesitant to take the risk that they might not succeed in doing so.
Lastly, therefore, unless one has an absolutist belief in the elite theory and sees no
validity in democratic-responsiveness theory whatsoever, the points I’ve just raised
about elite theory actually support the simultaneous existence of democraticresponsiveness theory. In the rest of this chapter, I will operate under democraticresponsiveness theory and focus on public opinion impacting elite decision making.
Research from Risse-Kappen and Cunningham et al. among many others provides
overwhelming support for the democratic-responsiveness theory, suggesting that public
opinion does, in fact, affect elite foreign policy decisions, especially in democracies.112
Scholars have identified a number of different mechanisms behind this effect. One
foundational mechanism is that elites cannot rely on always being able to convince the
public to support the foreign policy that they would prefer,113 or at least at a minimum,
that this is usually a long difficult process.114 Therefore, elites are forced to take public
opinion into account. One way this mechanism plays out is that public opinion constrains
foreign policy elites, namely that they decline to pursue certain policies if those policies
do not have sufficient public support.115 Another way is that public opinion will push
elites to discontinue or alter a given ongoing foreign policy because it is unpopular in its
current form.116 A third is that foreign policy elites are pressured to move policy in a
certain publicly supported direction and thus potentially to move in directions that they
would not otherwise take.117 A slightly different mechanism, proposed by Risse-Kappen,
is that public opinion on foreign policy affects the formation of elite coalitions with a
country’s domestic politics and that these, within the country's structural context, affect
the country’s foreign policy. He found that the US Government, because of its relatively
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open system, is more impacted by public opinion than otherwise similar counties such as
France.118
These mechanisms by which public opinion influences foreign policy are not,
however, uniformly applicable. Foyle found that while, across the board, policy makers
do take public opinion into account, their normative views as to the role that public
opinion should play in policy making combined with their views of whether considering
public opinion is necessary affect how much influence public opinion actually has. Based
on these dimensions he identifies different orientations that policy makers may hold. One
orientation consists of those who think that public opinion should play no role at all
because public opinion pressures are inherently less informed than elite experts, only
leading to worse outcomes, and because public support is not necessary to successful
policy. Right or wrong, this orientation affords public opinion the least influence on the
conduct of foreign policy. Even this orientation, however, is not insulated from the
dynamic that if a given policy is hugely unpopular and the public’s opposition cannot be
changed, the policy is unviable. Normatively similar, some policy makers do not want
public influence to guide policy formation but believe that public support is important
and willingly take it into account as much as they feel that they need to. This group
affords public opinion somewhat more influence. The other two groups, which
normatively believe that public opinion should guide policy making to some extent,
afford public opinion the most influence.119 Foyle documents that both Eisenhower and
Dulles believed that even though policy makers should be the ones deciding the direction
of policy, for foreign policies to be viable, they had to receive public support. Dulles said
that “[for] foreign policy to be successful [, it] must be supported and understood by the
people.”120 He concludes that this orientation informed how Eisenhower and Dulles
handled the US response to the First Taiwan Strait Crisis in line with how one would
have expected.121
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Historians of the Cold War have found that attention to public opinion was
widespread among foreign policy elites at the time, with both Feis and Santis describing
such attention to public opinion in their books.122 Evidence of elite attention to public
opinion is also present in the Sellers-Oelsner case. Internal State Department documents
confirm what McCloy wrote in his letter to his Soviet counterpart, namely that the public
attention the Sellers-Oelsner case received did not go unnoticed by American elites. In a
meeting on August 31st in which the Sellers-Oelsner case was discussed, both McCloy
and Hays mentioned the reaction of the public with Hays remarking that “It seemed to
create a good deal of disturbance back home.”123 Furthermore, Foyle found that public
opinion influenced certain aspects of the Truman Administration's foreign policy
specifically and that Byrnes, Truman’s first secretary of state, believed in a strong role for
public opinion in foreign policy making.124 What these various historical findings show is
that the Truman Administration, its members, and the Eisenhower administration that
succeeded it were all impacted by public opinion, a finding that is in line with the broader
literature. By extension, these findings suggest that it is highly likely that the foreign
policy elites most directly involved in the Sellers-Oelsner case would have responded to
public opinion in a similar way to how their colleagues did.
The American ability to wage the Cold War was enabled by the massive
deployment of public resources which required strong public and congressional
support.125 Therefore, as the implications of the findings I’ve just discussed dictate, it was
critical that the public supported those policies. As the Cold War intensified post WWII,
policy makers developed negative schemas of the Soviet Union more quickly than the
public’s views of the Soviet Union soured. Therefore, it seems likely that the operative
influence of public opinion of foreign policy elites was to constrain their ability to wage
the Cold War more aggressively. Here the concept of “anticipated future opinion”126 is
particularly relevant. It stipulates that elites are willing to go ahead of the public in the
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moment to where they think public opinion will end up, in keeping with the finding that
opinion constrains elite decision making but allowing for slightly more leeway among
elites.
Later in the conflict, when the enmity between the US and Soviet Union was
equally shared by the public and elites, the conflict was then driven by both public and
elite sentiment against the Soviet Union, and each one might have hindered any
movement toward détente. Initially however, in the conflict’s early years, the public
lagged behind elites. Therefore, anything that drove public opinion in the same direction
as elite opinion and thus lessened the constraining effect of the public was necessary for
the development of the Cold War, enabling it to intensify more quickly. Additionally, any
shifts in public opinion which drove it towards elite opinion and which were not caused
according to the elite theory are especially significant. They are significant because one
can say that the source of these helps explain why the Cold War developed as it did.
As discussed in the previous chapter, Hurwitz et al.’s research strongly suggests
that underlying public conceptions of the Soviet Union caused the public to be much
more likely to support certain types of Cold War policies.127 This finding, combined with
the findings discussed in the latter half of this chapter that foreign policy makers are
attentive to public opinion, allows me to draw definite conclusions about what the likely
impact of events like the Sellers-Oelsner case on the Cold War would have been. The
likely effect of these events in which the Soviet Union treated Americans poorly was that
the American public increasingly viewed the Soviet Union as a morally lacking and
untrustworthy threat, and as an adversary which needed to be countered. These
perceptions then translated into support for stronger and more aggressive Cold War
policies. For policy makers, this public support for such policies would have given them
more political support to pursue those more aggressive policies, lessening the
constraining effects of public opinion. Furthermore, if the public was ever ahead of elites
on some issue, might have pulled them in the direction.

127

Hurwitz et al., p 17-9.

64

In assessing the impact of citizen-centered, highly charged and highly covered
events, it is useful to consider the following counterfactual, namely that they had never
taken place. While the Cold War would have still occurred due to the causes I discussed
in the chapter about the Cold War’s history, it might have been slightly less intense, it
might not have become so intense so quickly, or it might have had a slightly less moral
tenor. These hypothetical outcomes are explained by slightly less negative American
perceptions of the Soviet Union. These less negative perceptions would have made the
gulf between elite and public opinion slightly wider which would have likely caused the
public to exert a larger restraining effect on policy makers. Such an effect would have led
to less aggressive Cold War policies and thus a less intense overall conflict. Furthermore,
without public views of the Soviet Union based on the maltreatment of one’s tribe, the
negative American perceptions of the Soviet Union would have been more abstract and
less visceral. That would have made the tenor of the relationship more adversarial and
less inimical.
It is impossible to conclude how much of an impact the Sellers-Oelsner case had
on the Cold War. In all likelihood, on its own, the impact of the Sellers-Oelsner case was
almost negligible. What the Sellers-Oelsner case does show, however, are the
mechanisms by which such cases would have impacted the Cold War. Insofar as their
case strengthened public perceptions that the Soviet Union was a threat and that it could
not be not be trusted, they increased the public’s support for more forceful policies to
combat the Soviet Union. This effect on public opinion in turn affected policy makers,
allowing them to enact more confrontational, aggressive policies that would have
intensified the Cold War more quickly. Thus, when the Sellers-Oelsner case is not taken
in isolation and its likely qualitative impact is magnified by other similar cases’ impacts
in the same period of time, it seems that through their effects on public opinion, these
cases did have a quite modest yet significant impact on the Cold War.
Chapter 8, Conclusion:
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The first five years of the Cold War were an extraordinary period in history.
Incredibly quickly the US and Soviet Union went from wartime allies to ardent
adversaries, creating a conflict that would define the world for the next half century and
beyond. In order for that shift to occur so rapidly, the US and Soviet Union had to
develop markedly different conceptions of each other than they had just had and had to
view each other with newly potent fear and suspicion. Especially in the United States, not
just elites but also the general public had to experience parallel shifts in their conceptions
of the Soviet Union. While historians have identified crucial, mostly geopolitical events,
underlying societal differences, and geopolitical competition as the predominant causes
of this shift, there were other types of smaller events and other less salient dynamics
which also contributed to the development of animosity between the two countries.
This honors thesis evaluates the effects of highly charged, highly covered, and
civilian-centered, less geopolitical events on the development of the Cold War during its
early years. As a case study, it uses the heretofore unstudied two-month imprisonment in
Soviet custody in East Germany and the eventual release of American students Sellers
and Oelsner. In order to evaluate the effects of such cases, this thesis proposes two
sequences of effects which relate this type of event to Cold War foreign policy decision
making. One traces the effects of the case on elite opinion and the other its effects on
public opinion.
The elite opinion sequence starts with the application of Larson’s and Holsti’s
psychological schema research which shows that elites develop broad impressions of
other countries and foreign policy questions through a combination of intellectual
understandings and specific exemplars. I show both how the Sellers-Oelsner case likely
would have functioned as an exemplar in a Cold War schema and how it could have
contributed to a larger intellectual understanding of the Soviet Union. I then turn to their
research showing that elite schemas had large impacts on American foreign policy
formation during the Cold War. I show how schemas made more distrustful and
adversarial by events like the Sellers-Oelsner case would have led to more aggressive and
more uncompromising foreign policy decisions and, by extension, a more intense Cold
War. I therefore propose that compounding over years, the many cases like the Sellers66

Oelsner case exerted a modest yet significant contributing effect on the quick
development of the increasingly adversarial Cold War.
The public opinion sequence is more complex than the elite one. First, this thesis
draws on studies of news coverage of the Soviet Union at the time and finds that many of
the common media biases against the Soviet Union manifested themselves in the
extensive press coverage of the Sellers-Oelsner case, making a damning set of facts even
seem even worse. Next, it employs studies showing that press coverage affects public
opinion to show that the press coverage of the Sellers-Oelsner case almost certainly had
such an effect. I subsequently draw on Hurwitz et al.’s empirically supported theory of
Cold War public opinion formation which shows that like elites, the public creates
schematic general understandings of the conflict and the Soviet Union. I then show how
press coverage of the Soviets’ maltreatment of Sellers and Oelsner would have
contributed to public impressions that the Soviet Union was an untrustworthy, threatening
force. Based on the creation of these impressions, I employ Hurwitz et al.’s findings that
these specific impressions translate into increased support for containment policy and
increasing the size of the military. I finally turn to repeated findings that public opinion
and public support for certain policies affect the decisions of foreign policy makers.
Thus, insofar as public opinion pushed policy makers towards these policies, public
opinion intensified the Cold War. In summary, I show how, through this sequence of
effects, events like the Sellers-Oelsner case would likely have led to a more intense Cold
War. Therefore, as in the case of the elite opinion sequence, I propose that compounding
over years, the many cases like the Sellers-Oelsner case exerted a modest yet significant
contributing effect on the quick development of the increasingly adversarial Cold War.
While the sequences of effects that I propose fit the Sellers-Oelsner case well,
they should be applied to a wide variety of different types of cases to see whether they
continue to provide a reasonable link between the events of a particular case and the
making of relevant policy. It would be ideal to do this with both widely studied cases like
the Iranian Hostage Crisis as well as obscure cases. Here comparative work that applies
the sequences of effects to a number of cases and evaluates them side by side would be
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particularly useful. I hope to see that work done whether it uses the Sellers-Oelsner case
or not.
I was not able to do intensive research into the careers and biographies of the
high-ranking American officials who were involved in the Sellers-Oelsner case. Instead,
to deduce the likely effects that the case had on them, I relied on a combination of their
documented involvement in the case and general theories of elite opinion formation. I
hope biographically oriented research into the same effect will be conducted for this and
other similar cases.
There are also many particular facets of the Sellers-Oelsner case that go beyond
the scope of this honors thesis. One such facet is the role that Sellers’ and Oelsner’s
privileged backgrounds played in the American government’s response to their case.
Both of their families were wealthy and well-connected and leaned on their connections,
facts that were frequently noted in press coverage which archaically described them as
“socially prominent.”128 Oelsner’s father was the CEO of an international shipping
business. Furthermore, those connections included personal relationships with thencurrent and former high-ranking State Department officials. Sellers’ mother, Therese
Tyler Sellers, was the cousin and god daughter of former American Ambassador to the
Soviet Union William C. Bullitt and Assistant Secretary of State Murphy, who played a
large role in the case throughout its duration, was a family friend of the Oelsners.129 Did
who Sellers and Oelsner were cause the government to take their case more seriously and
respond to it more quickly? A similar question can be asked of the Soviet government.
While it’s impossible to know how much the Soviets knew about Sellers and Oelsner and
how well they understood the significance of what they knew in American society, the
Soviets’ hours of grilling Sellers and Oelsner about every detail of their lives likely gave
them at least some idea that Sellers and Oelsner were atypically well connected. Did this
lead to better treatment of Sellers and Oelsner and potentially hasten their release?
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I hope that all these themes and questions will be the subjects of future research,
either in the context of this case or others. In general, I hope that the detailed introduction
of this case into the historical record will lead it to be used in future research of any topic.
The most important conclusion of this thesis is not the likely effect of the SellersOelsner case on the Cold War in and of itself. Rather it concerns the mechanisms by
which it and other similar cases likely had some slight eventual effect on policy. Thus,
the Sellers-Oelsner case contains potentially important lessons for current and future
foreign policy makers. Because citizen-centered events are compelling and receive media
coverage, and because that coverage affects public opinion and in turn foreign policy,
government choices that create and respond to these events have indirect impacts on
future international relations. If governments seek to lessen tension, then they should seek
to minimize this type of event. If, on the other hand, a government is seeking to foster
antagonistic public opinion or lower-level elite opinion against another country, then
events such as these would be one means of accomplishing such changes in opinions of a
relationship. While these lessons are relevant to any US-foreign country relationship, the
increasingly intense great power competition between the US and China is likely to be by
far the most consequential of these relationships. As some commentators130 raise the
prospect of Sino-American relations potentially coming to resemble the Cold War in
certain ways, the Chinese and American governments would do well to keep the lessons
of the Sellers-Oelsner case in mind as they shape what may well be the most significant
bilateral relationship of the 21st century.
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